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COMMENTS 
MARYLAND'S FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN A 
THOROUGH AND EFFICIENT SYSTEM OF PUBLIC 
EDUCATION: THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL 
INTERVENTION 
After the 1983 Court of Appeals of Maryland decision in Horn-
beck v. Somerset County Board of Education there appeared little 
hope for those who wished to reform disparities in public school 
financing through the courts; With the recent publication of the 
Maryland School Performance Program Reports, however, and en-
lightened decisions in other jurisdictions holding similar public school 
financing schemes unconstitutional, evidence has emerged which is 
capable of reviving a state constitutional challenge to Maryland's 
existing public school financing scheme which is based upon local 
wealth. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Education is vital to the exercise of fundamental rights guaran-
teed through the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution l and by article XXIV of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights.2 The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that 
I. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that no state 
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Bill of Rights has been applied to 
the states through the fourteenth amendment on a selective basis. The concept 
of due process, however, is not limited to the protection of the Bill of Rights. 
See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DaIl.) 386, 388 (1798) (fundamental rights cannot 
be taken away by acts of state legislatures); see generally Ratner, A New Legal 
Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. 
L. REv. 777 (1985); see also, Biegel, Reassessing the Applicability of Funda-
mental Rights Analysis: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Shaping of 
Educational Policy After Kadrmas v. Dickenson Public Schools, 74 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1078 (1989), for an in-depth examination of educational opportunity 
in the context of fundamental rights analysis. 
2. Article XXIV of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: "That no man 
ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his "freehold, liberties or 
privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived 
of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the 
Law of the land." Maryland courts have recognized that the concept of equal 
protection is embodied in the due process requirement of article XXIV. 
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"education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments. "3 
In Plyler v. Doe, however, the Supreme Court held that, at least 
for the purposes of the federal Constitution's equal protection clause, 
education is not a fundamental right. 4 The Court added that, on the 
other hand, "neither is [education] merely some governmental 'ben-
efit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation." 
, Supreme Court decisions have repeatedly recognized public educa-
tion as a unifying social force and basic tool for shaping democratic 
values.6 An effective public school education in basic skills, available 
Hornbeck v. Somerset Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 616 n.4, 458 A.2d 758, 
768 n.4 (1983). The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and 
the concept of equal protection embodied· in article XXIV of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights are in pari materia and generally apply in a like manner. 
[d. at 640, 458 A.2d at 781. However, the two provisions are independent of 
each other so that a violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other. [d. . 
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). Note that the words of 
the Supreme Court in Brown retain their relevance today: 
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for 
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of 
education to a democratic society. It is required in the performance 
of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed 
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a 
principle instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training and in helping him to 
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that 
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied 
the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state 
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available 
to all on equal terms. 
[d. at 493; see also Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 
190 (Ky. 1989) (citing Brown in the context of finding Kentucky's public school 
financing scheme unconstitutional as applied to poorer urban school districts).' 
4. 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). 
5. [d. See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 
(1973) (Texas public school financing system using local property taxation as 
a base is not violative of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal 
protection when "no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to 
provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills 
necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation 
in the political process. "). 
6. See Abingdon School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) _ (Brennan, 
J. concurring) ("Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic 
institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government. "); 
Illinois ex rei. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (terming the public school as "the most powerful 
agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people ... 
at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for 
promoting our common destiny"). 
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on a nondiscriminatory basis to all Maryland school children, would 
contribute immeasurably to the "social, economic, intellectual and 
psychological well-being of the individual"7 and to the success of the 
state as a whole.8 When education is linked with the political process, 
the Supreme Court and state courts of last resort have held that the 
right to a certain minimum of education may command constitutional 
protection.9 
7. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 231, 287 A.2d 187, 191 (1972) (citing 
WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 114-116 (S. Brown ed. 1941». See Plyler v. Doe, 457 
V.S. 202, 222 (1982); see also Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401, 483 
(D.D.C. 1967); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 
601 (1971) (Serrano I). In Serrano I, the court stated that: 
[EJducation is unmatched in the extent to which it molds the person-
ality of the youth of society. While police and fire protection, garbage 
collection and street lights are essentially neutral in their effect on the 
individual psyche, public education actively attempts to shape a child's 
personal development in a manner chosen not by the child or his 
parents but by the state. 
Id. at 609-10, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (citing Coons, Clune & 
Sugarman, 57 CAL. L. REv. 305, 389); see also Biegel, supra note I, at 1106-
13. In addition, there is an integral relationship between self-esteem and 
academic achievement. See Mayer, The Self-Esteem Movement and the Right 
to an Education Under California Constitutional Law, 5 V.C.L.A. J. Eouc. 
123 (1991). 
8. See generally Ratner, supra note I, at 781-85. Ratner identifies three funda-
mental functions of public school education which benefit society: 
I) Political Function - Basic skills are necessary to protect free people from 
tyranny. Citizens must be literate to intelligently exercise their basic civic duty 
to vote, and to exercise their First Amendment rights in participation in our 
democratic political process that depends on each individual's ability to protect 
her own interests. Id. at 782-83; 
2) Economic Function - In an industrialized and increasingly complex society, 
basic skills are necessary to equip each child to compete in the labor market. 
The failure to adequately educate students in basic skills is costly to society: 
Functionally illiterate adults make up a disproportionately large 
percentage of the unemployed, depriving the country of valuable 
contributions to the gross national product and corresponding 
tax revenue. Furthermore, functional illiterates who are employed 
can be dangerous to themselves and to others, as well as expensive 
to employers. Disproportionately high percentages of this group 
commit crimes. Society not only suffers the, direct financial, 
physical, and emotional losses caused by crime, but pays billions 
of dollars per year to imprison the criminals. In addition, dis-
proportionately high percentages of illiterate adults need welfare 
and other forms of governmental assistance, for which society 
pays billions of dollars per year. 
Id. at 783-84. 
3) National Defense Function - The level of skills needed for effective 
military performance has increased because technology is more demanding. The 
failure to sufficiently educate people seeking to enlist is one of the most serious 
deficiencies in our national defense. Id. at 784-85. 
9. The importance of public education to the political process has long been 
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Section one of article VIII of the Maryland Constitution requires 
that the General Assembly establish "a thorough and efficient" 
recognized. In the words of Thomas Jefferson: 
There is also an artificial aristocracy, founded on wealth and birth 
. . . . The artificial aristocracy is a mischievous ingredient in govern-
ment, and provision should be made to prevent its ascendancy .... 
At the first session of our legislature [in Virginia) after the Declaration 
of Independence, we passed ... laws, drawn by myself, [which] laid 
the ax to the foot of pseudo-aristocracy. And had another which I 
prepared been adopted by the legislature, our work would have been 
complete. It was a bill for the more general diffusion of learning. 
This proposed to divide every county into wards ... like your 
townships; to establish in each ward a free school for reading, writing 
and common arithmetic; to provide for the annual selection of the 
best subjects from these schools, who might receive at the public 
expense, a higher degree of education at a district school .... Worth 
and genius would have thus been sought out from every condition of 
life and completely prepared by education for defeating the competi-
tion of wealth and birth for public trusts. 
Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 231, 287 A.2d 187, 191 (1972) (citing 
WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 114-16 (S. Brown ed. 1941». 
On the state level, a public school financing scheme which "condition[ed) 
full entitlement to [education] on wealth" was held to violate equal protection 
by the California Supreme Court in Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 48'7 P.2d 1241, 
96 Cal. Rptr. 601. That court made a direct analogy between education and 
voting, stating "both are crucial to participation in, and the functioning of, a 
democracy .... At a minimum, education makes more meaningful the casting 
of a ballot ... [and] is likely to provide the understanding of, and the interest 
in, public issues which are to spur involvement in other civic and political 
activities." Serrano I; 5 Cal. 3d at 608, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal Rptr. at 
618. The Serrano I court also noted that the Supreme Court has recognized 
the "sensitive interplay between education and the cherished First Amendment 
right of free speech." Id. at 608 n.25, 487 P.2d at 1258 n.25, 96 Cal. Rptr. 
at 618 n.25 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ("The vigilant 
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the com-
munity of American schools."». See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 
U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The classroom is peculiarly the 'market place of ideas.' 
The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to 
[a) robust exchange of ideas .. ."). 
The Serrano I court treated education as a "fundamental interest" due to 
the "distinctive and priceless function of education in our society." Serrano 
I, 5 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618. The court 
found support for this treatment in the stress placed upon the uniqueness of 
education by the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
Id. at 609 n.26, 487 P.2d at 1258 n.26, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618 n.26. While 
upholding a city's right to close municipal swimming pools rather than operate 
them on an integrated basis, the Palmer Court distinguished its earlier refusal 
in Brown v. Board oj Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1959) (Brown I), to allow the 
closing of schools to avoid desegregation, stating that Brown 1 "did not involve 
swimming pools but rather public schools, an enterprise we have described as 
'perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. '" Id. 
(quoting Palmer, 403 U.S. at 221 n.6). This distinction was also made by 
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system of free public schools throughout the state and "provide by 
taxation, or otherwise, for their maintenance."l0 Maryland's public 
elementary and secondary school system is administered by the State 
Department of Education pursuant to the provisions of the Education 
Article of the Maryland Code. 1I The General Assembly has charged 
the State Board of Education, as head of the State Department of 
Education, with the duty of determining the educational policies of 
Justice Blackmun, who emphasized in his concurring opinion that "[t]he pools 
are not part of the city's educational system. They are a general municipal 
service of the nice-to-have but not essential variety." Id. (quoting Palmer, 403 
U.S. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring». 
The Serrano I decision was subsequently reconsidered in light of the 
Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 
135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (Serrano II). The Serrano II court adhered to the 
determinations of Serrano I based upon the California constitutional provision 
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws, stating that the state equal protection 
provisions, while "substantially the equivalent of" the guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, "are possessed of an independent vitality .... " Id. 
at 764-65, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366-67. The Serrano II court 
likewise reiterated its Serrano I holding that a public school financing scheme, 
which, by drawing distinctions on the basis of district wealth, violated the 
equal protection of students under state constitutional provisions. Id. at 766, 
557 P.2d at 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 367. Just as the Supreme Court supported 
its decision in Rodriguez partly on the basis that the issue of financing an 
education raised serious considerations of federalism and deference to local 
decisions, the Serrano II court found support for its conclusion in the language 
of Rodriguez, noting that: . 
The high court, in passing on the validity of the Texas system under 
the federal equal protection clause, repeatedly emphasized its lack of 
"expertise" and familiarity with local problems of school financing 
and educational policy, which lack of expertise "counsel[s] against 
premature interference with informed judgments made at the state 
and local levels." 
Id. (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42). 
The Serrano court also examined the indispensable role played by education 
in the modern industrial state: 
This role, we believe, has two significant aspects: first, education is 
a major determinant of an individUal's chances for economic and 
social success in our competitive society; second, education is a unique 
influence on a child's development as a citizen and his participation 
in political and community life. '[T]he pivotal position of education 
to success in American society and its essential role in opening up to 
the individual the central experiences of our culture lend it an impor-
tance that is undeniable.' Thus, education is the lifeline of both the 
individual and society. 
Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 605, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16 (1971) 
(quoting Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 
1065, 1129 (1969». 
10. MD. CONST.art. VIII, § 1. 
11. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. (1989 & Supp .. 1990). 
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the State. 12 The State Board of Education is empowered to determine 
and carry out policies, and to adopt bylaws, rules, and regulations 
for the administration of the public school system. 13 The State 
Superintendent of Schools is responsible for the administration of 
the Department of Education. 14 
Maryland's public school system consists of twenty-four school 
districts, one for each county and Baltimore CityY Each school 
district has its own school board, which, together with its local school 
superintendent, controls the educational matters of its district. 16 Al-
though local authorities determine the educational policy within their 
district, the State Board of Education has the last word on any 
matter concerning the policy and administration of public education. 17 
Local school boards remain subject to the applicable bylaws, rules 
and regulations of the State Board of Education, which have the 
force of law when adopted and published. IS The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland has expressly stated that the State Board of Education 
plays a "paramount role in interpreting the [State's] education law."19 
The State Board of Education has. published reports on the 
performance of Maryland's public elementary and secondary schools 
for the 1989-90, and 1990-91 school years. 20 These reports show gross 
inequities among school districts in the quality of education available 
to Maryland school children.21 These inequities are indisputably linked 
to the fact that financing for Maryland public schools is based on 
local wealth.22 
The failure to provide an effective education in basic skills to a 
large number of Maryland school children not only results in pro-
12. Clinton v. Board of Educ., 315 Md. 666, 678, 556 A.2d 273, 279 (1989). 
13. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 2-205(b) (1989). 




17. Wilson v. Board of Educ., 234 Md. 561, 565, 200 A.2d 67, 69 (1964). 
18. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 2-205(c)(2)-(c)(3) (1989). 
19. Clinton .v. Board of Educ., 315 Md. 666, 678, 556 A.2d 273, 279 (1989) 
(citations omitted). 
20. MARYLAND STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., MARYLAND SCHOOL PERFORMANCE PROGRAM 
REpORT 1990, STATE & SCHOOL Sys. (1990) (Foreword by Joseph L. Shilling, 
State Superintendent of Schools) [hereinafter 1990 MSPP REpORT]; MARYLAND 
STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., MARYLAND SCHOOL· PERFORMANCE PROGRAM REPORT 
1991, STATE & SCHOOL Sys. (1991) (Foreword by Nancy S. Grasmick, State 
Superintendent of Schools) [hereinafter 1991 MSPP REPORT]. 
21. See 1990 & 1991 MSPP REpORTS, supra note 20; c/. Hornbeck v. Somerset 
County Bd; of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 611-14, 458 A.2d 758, 766-67 (1983). 
22. See Hornbeck at 611-16, 458 A.2d at 766-68; see also Rose v. Council for 
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 198-99 (Ky. 1989); Edgewood Indep. 
School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989). See generally Briffault, 
Our Localism, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 21, 27 (1990). 
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found injuries to these children, but produces severe political, eco-
nomic, and social costs to the state.23 Despite evidence of the 
detrimental effects of Maryland's existing public school financing 
scheme, the General Assembly has failed to correct these inadequa-
cies.24 Consequently, the courts must act in accordance with the 
23. Cf. Ratner, supra note I, at 781-795; see also Biegel, Reassessing the Appli-
cability of Fundamental Rights Analysis: The Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Shaping of Educational Policy After Kadrmas v. Dickenson Public Schools, 
74 CORNELL L. REv. 1078, 1106-1116 (1989). The State of Maryland pays a 
high price for its failure to provide an adequate education to a large segment 
of its population, especially in the area of unemployment. In fiscal year 1991, 
unemployment alone cost the State $409 million. Maryland Dep't. of Economic 
& Employment, Office of Labor Market Analysis & Information, Unemploy-
ment Insurance Activity Report, Fiscal Year 1991 at 1 (1991); cf. Biegel, supra 
note I, at 1113-14 (discussion of the views of educators, policymakers and 
business on the cost of. denying adequate education). Xerox Corporation 
Chairperson David T. Kerns has declared: "[I]f we do not restructure our 
schools, this nation will be out of business by the year 2000." Biegel, supra 
note I, at 1114. 
24. There has been increasing statewide attention to the problems facing our public 
school system. The Metropolitan Education Coalition (MEC) has been active 
in attempting to improve the quality of education in the Baltimore area by 
informing the public and legislators about education concerns, and specifically 
by proposing a model funding formula which became a widely supported 
Senate Bill. Metropolitan Education Coalition Newsletter, Spring 1991 [here-
inafter Spring 1991 MEC Newsletter]; Metropolitan Education Coalition News-
letter, Special Edition, Fall 1990 [hereinafter Fall 1990 MEC Newsletter] (both 
on file with the University of Baltimore Law Review). The MEC platform 
includes, inter alia, the following principles: 
SCHOOL PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY - Principles: 
Efforts to demonstrate effectiveness and accountability in the spending 
of funds, through school performance programs of assessment and 
accountability for outcomes, are essential to building public confidence 
in public school systems. Such programs should measure school and 
school system progress compared to their baseline data so that those 
systems working against greater odds are not penalized. Support and 
incentives toward reaching standards should be emphasized to ensure 
success for all students regardless of background or place of residence: 
FUNDING EQUALIZATION - Principles: The primary responsibility 
for furiding public education lies with the state. Therefore, state 
funding must be improved and distributed so as to promote equity. 
The local and federal governments also share responsibility for meeting 
fundamental education requirements. These responsibilities must be 
carried out in a flexible and fair manner in order to meet the differing 
needs of students around the state. 
Fall 1990 MEC Newsletter, at 3. 
Other education promoters echo the MEC's position that none of their 
specific concerns can be addressed until public school financing is made more 
equitable. Miller, Funding Reform Top Priority of Metro Education Coalition, 
Fall 1990 MEC Newsletter at 2-3. In July 1990, at State Board of Education 
hearings held to consider opinions on proposals for reform submitted by 
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Maryland Constitution to ensure that public school financing is 
Superintendent of Schools, Joseph Schilling, MEC's testimony on equitable 
financing drew support from "average" districts, such as Dorchester County, 
and from the highest spending district, Montgomery County, in addition to 
the poorer counties. [d. Dr. Robert C. Dubel, then Superintendent of Baltimore 
County schools was "fully supportive" of [MEC) , stating, "I'm not saying 
the county doesn't have funding needs too, but I certainly think it is good 
and proper for Baltimore City to get a bigger share of the pie." [d. 
Lawmakers also recognize that Maryland public schools are failing under 
the existing financing scheme. In 1991, for example, Senators Young, Piccinini, 
Miedusiewski, Lawlah, Hughes, Pica and Blount introduced Senate Bill No. 
494, for the purpose of creating an Aid for Needy Schools fund. The bill's 
preamble explains the premises upon which the proposal was based: 
WHEREAS, It is the intent of the General Assembly to provide 
the best educational opportunities for all elementary and secondary 
school age children in the State through a general system of free 
public schools; and . 
WHEREAS, The majority of the funding for the public school 
system comes from the taxing of assessable real property by each of 
the subdivisions of the State; and 
WHEREAS, It is becoming increasingly apparent that this funding 
scheme is falling short of providing adequate and consistent amounts 
of revenue throughout the State; and 
WHEREAS, The inequities in the funding levels are so significant 
as to preclude the delivery of quality educational opportunities to all 
elementary and secondary public schools in the State; and 
WHEREAS, The federal, State, and local governments are severely 
limited in improving this deficit due to ever-growing and competing 
priorities; and 
WHEREAS, The people of the State, who each stand to benefit 
from a public school system that provides quality education to all 
students, should be given the opportunity to volunteer to assist directly 
in alleviating the funding gaps in the public school system; and 
WHEREAS, The financial institutions where the people of the State 
conduct their financial transactions are best equipped to facilitate the 
voluntary donations that citizens may want to make in order to help 
the schools that are in need of additional funding .... 
The Aid for Needy Schools fund seemed to be intended to facilitate the 
opportunity to make "charitable" donations to needy public schools by estab-
lishing check book contribution plans with local banks to be administered by 
the State Board of Education. S.B. 494 (introduced Feb. 1, 1991). 
However, the 1991 legislative session ended with no action taken by the 
General Assembly to improve public school financing, though· several other 
bills which addressed the public school financing problem were introduced. 
Each of these bills either did not make it out of the committee to which they 
were assigned, or were assigned to interim study. See S.B. 839 (introduced 
March 4, 1991) (repealing Maryland's existing public school financing scheme); 
S.B. 764 (introduced Feb. II, 1991) (the Tax Fairness Act of 1991) (imple-
menting the recommendation of the Governor's Commission on State Taxes 
and Tax Structure (Linowes»; S.B. 550 (introduced Feb. I, 1991) (the Gover-
nor's New Action Plan for Educational Excellence (APEX»; S.B. 494 (intro-
duced Feb. I, 1991) (Education-Aid for Needy School Funds); S.B. 321 
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sufficient to provide the means for an adequate education to all 
school children throughout the state.2' 
(introduced Jan. 30, 1991) (Public Education - Cost of Education Index, adding 
to Section 5-202(g) of the Maryland Education Code); H.B. 203 (introduced 
Jan. 24, 1991) (State Aid for Public Education - Schools for Success); H.B. 
677 (introduced Feb. I, 1991) (allowing income tax deductions for contributions 
to local districts); S.B. 757 (introduced Feb. 11, 1991) (requiring local districts 
to pay for social security and retirement increases beyond fiscal year 1991 
level). In addition, the House Ways and Means Committee issued an unfavor-
able report on H.B. 886, (Maryland School Performance Accountability Re-
ports), which would enact the Maryland School Performance system as 
accountability reporting requirements. 
Past efforts of the General Assembly have not achieved the constitutionally-
mandated level of education under a public school financing scheme based 
upon local wealth. In 1979, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 243, which 
increased the foundation amount from $624 to $784, and required State and 
local governments to share the new money on a 50/50 basis and continue to 
share the old money ($624) on a 55/45 basis; That same year, the Task Force 
to Study State-Local Fiscal Relationships (Scanlan Task Force), a commission 
appointed in 1979, first looked at the concept of relating state aid for current 
expenses to actual education expenditures. The Scanlan Task Force recom-
mended improvements to the financing formula, such as a substantial increase 
in the minimum amount that a district may spend on current basic expenses 
per pupil. In response, the 1980 General Assembly passed legislation which, in 
theory, tied the per pupil foundation amount to actual per student spending. 
See 1980 Md. Laws, ch. 531. Chapter 531 increased the foundation amount to 
$924. The foundation amount was to equal 7511/0 of the statewide three year 
average of per pupil expenditures for basic current expenses. However, the 
overall financing level was never based on actual spending because yearly 
increases in the foundation amount were capped at the lesser of eight percent 
or the annual increase in the consumer price index. This cap never permitted 
aid levels to be on par with spending levels. See DEPARTMENT OF FISCAL SERVS., 
VOL. VII LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK SERIES, MARYLAND LOCAL GOVERNMENT-
REVENUES AND TAXES 98 (1990) [hereinafter MLGRT). 
In 1983, the Task Force to Study the Funding of Public Education (Civiletti 
Task Force) reaffirmed the concept of using a 7511/0 expenditure target to 
determine the per pupil foundation amount. Although the Civiletti Task Force 
wanted to reach 7511/0 of a two-year average of per pupil expenditures for basic 
current expenses by fiscal year 1989, the General Assembly enacted a less costly 
recommendation. See 1984 Md. Laws, ch. 85. The General Assembly set flat 
dollar amounts for the foundation amount through fiscal year 1989, and 
thereafter the three year average spending level was to be used with the eight 
percent cap remaining. The Civiletti legislation also established an Accounta-
bility Task force to ensure that new monies were used for instruction and for 
teacher's salaries. In 1988, the Accountability Task Force was terminated and 
responsibility for review of accountability reports was transferred to the State 
Department of Education. See MLGRT, supra, at 101. 
In 1987, The Action Plan for Educational Excellence (APEX Plan) was 
enacted. See 1987 Md. Laws, ch. 277. The APEX Plan modified the basic' 
current expense formula, basing the per pupil financing levels after fiscal year 
1992 on two-year average expenditure figures. The flat dollar rate remains in 
effect through fiscal year 1992. In fiscal year 1993, the two-year average 
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In advocating judicial intervention in the area of public school 
financing based on local wealth, this Comment first explains the 
General Assembly's affirmative obligation under article VIII of the 
Maryland Constitution to provide an adequate public education to 
all Maryland school children. The Comment then examines the 
evidence necessary to raise a constitutional challenge to Maryland's 
existing public school financing scheme, on the ground that it violates 
article VIII. In support of the soundness of judicial intervention into 
the area of public school financing based on local wealth, the 
experience of jurisdictions with similar constitutional requirements 
and public school financing schemes, in particular New Jersey, is 
examined. The experience of these jurisdictions reveals that deference 
to the legislature in the area of public school financing based on 
local wealth results in protracted legal battles which prolong the 
injuries to affected school children. Ultimately, judicial intervention 
is required to' uphold constitutional mandates to provide adequate 
education. 
The State of Maryland is constitutionally mandated to spend its 
money to provide an adequate public school education. Thus far, 
however, the General Assembly's efforts to provide such an education 
have failed under the existing public school financing scheme. For 
this reason, this Comment concludes that immediate judicial inter-
vention is warranted. The General Assembly should be ordered to 
fulfill its affirmative obligation to provide school children with an 
education constitutionally mandated to be "thorough and efficient." 
II. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S AFFIRMATIVE 
OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE FOR ADEQUATE EDUCATION 
A. The State Constitution Mandates that the General Assembly 
Establish a System oj Free Public Schools 
Under the Maryland Constitution, the General Assembly has an 
affirmative obligation to provide a "thorough and efficient" system 
spending level will determine the foundation amount. The distinction between 
this plan and previous enactments is that annual increases are not automatically 
capped. See MLGRT, supra, at 99. Total state aid for education, however, 
has never exceeded 30 percent of general fund revenues. If state aid for 
education in anyone year exceeds 31.5 percent of total general fund revenues, 
the foundation amount for that year may not be implemented unless the 
General Assembly affirms by joint resolution that the state has the fiscal 
resources for the aid required. [d. at 101. If a joint resolution is not enacted, 
basic current expense is capped at eight percent over the prior year's amount. 
[d. 
25. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 632, 639, 458 A.2d at 776-77, 780. 
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of public school education. 26 In 1983, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, in Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education,27 
recognized the General Assembly's duty to establish a statewide public 
school system which "provide[s] the State's youth with a basic public 
school education" that is "effective in all· districts. "28 The court 
stated that compliance with this duty would result in compliance with 
article VIII of the Maryland Constitution which provides: 
The General Assembly . . . shall by Law establish through-
out the State a thorough and efficient System of Free Public 
Schools; and shall provide by taxation, or otherwise, for 
their maintenance. 29 
The Hornbeck court recognized that under article VIII, the public 
school financing fund "shall be kept inviolate, and appropriated only 
to the purposes of Education. "30 The court also noted three important 
aspects of article III of the Maryland Constitution: one, that the 
State budget shall "include an· 'estimate of all appropriations ... in 
conformity with Art. VIII;"'31 two, that the General Assembly is 
prohibited from amending the Budget Bill so as to affect the provi-
sions made by the laws of the State for the establishment and 
maintenance of a system of public schools;32 and three, that the 
Governor shall include the estimates for financing public schools in 
the budget "without revision.' '33 
These constitutional provisions evince the fundamental principle 
that State responsibility for the effectiveness of public education34 is 
"vital to the history and traditions of the people of this State. "35 
The Hornbeck court acknowledged that education plays a central 
role in one's chances for economic and social success, and influences 
one's development as a good citizen and participant in political and 
community life. 36 Although the right to education is explicit in the 
Maryland Constitution, the Hornbeck court agreed with the Supreme 
Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
26. MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
27. 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983). 
28. [d. at 632, 458 A.2d at 776. 
29. MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
30. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 608 n.3, 458 A.2d at 764 n.3. 
31. [d. at 646, 458 A.2d at 784 (citing MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(4». 
32. [d. (citing MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(6». 
33. [d. (citing MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(11». 
34. [d. at 668, 458 A.2d at 795. (Cole, J., dissenting) ("it is the State's responsibility 
to provide for the maintenance of the school system") (emphasis in original). 
35. Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 715, 426 A.2d 929, 947 (1981). 
36. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 649-50, 458 A.2d at 786. 
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Rodriguez,3? and held that, under both the Maryland Constitution38 
and the United States Constitution, education is not a fundamental 
right. 39 Consequently, the Hornbeck court explained that the public 
school financing scheme chosen by the General Assembly is subject 
to careful examination by the courts only if a significant deprivation 
of the right to adequate education occurs.40 
B. The Maryland Public School Financing Scheme 
The financing scheme chosen by the Maryland legislature places 
responsibility for public school financing largely on the individual 
counties. Because the Maryland Constitution obligates the State -
not the counties - to provide financing for public education, the 
State has abdicated its constitutional responsibility. 
Maryland's public school financing scheme, codified in section 
5-202(b) of the Education Article of the Maryland Code, is patently 
dependent upon local wealth.41 Called the "Lee~Maurer formula,"42 
the financing scheme pays for "basic current expenses"43 with both 
state and county revenues.44 The State, however, pays for only a 
percentage of the minimum amount that must be spent on each 
child, with local revenues paying for the rest. 4S Those districts with 
less wealth have less to contribute to their local education. 
The financing scheme works as follows. The General Assembly 
first establishes a "foundation" amount, which is the minimum 
37. 411 U.S. I (1973). 
38. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 642, 458 A.2d at 782. 
39. Id. at 650, 458 A.2d at 786; see supra note I and accompanying text. 
40. Id. at 652, 458 A.2d at 787. 
41. See id. at 605, 458 A.2d at 762; MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 5-202(b) (1989 & 
Supp. 1991). 
42. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 5-202(b) (1989 & Supp. 1991). 
43. "Basic current expenses" are the expenditures made by a county from State 
and county revenue for public elementary and secondary schools (with the 
exception of payment for debt service, capital outlay, transportation, and state 
aid for handicapped children, driver education and food services). MD. EDUC. 
CODE ANN. § 5-202(a)(3) (1989); see also Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 604, 458 A.2d 
at 762. 
44. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 604-05, 458 A.2d at 762-63. Federal aid is minimal, 
accounting for approximately eight percent of total aid. See id. n.l; see also 
Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 331, 575 A.2d 359, 381 (1990). For the 1986-
87 fiscal year, federal revenues provided 6.4 percent of the average state public 
school financing budget. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP'T. OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUC. STATISTICS 1989, at 149. In any event, 
federal aid should not be a factor in determining the state's obligation. The 
Abbott court found that even the mere consideration of federal aid in deter-
mining the need for or amount of state aid would violate federal law. Abbott, 
119 N.J. at 331, 575 A.2d at 381. 
45. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 605, 458 A.2d at 762-63. 
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amount each district must spend annually on basic current expenses 
for each child enrolled.46 The State then contributes financial assis-
tance only as a percentage of this predetermined foundation amount 
set by the General Assembly. 47 The rest of the foundation amount 
46.Id. 
47. Id. The Hornbeck court observed that the General Assembly intended this 
scheme to equalize for differences in local wealth by providing a larger 
contribution of state aid to the school districts with lesser wealth per student, 
in order for each district to meet its foundation amount. See id. Under § 5-
202(a), a district's wealth is determined by the sum of the assessed valuation 
of real property, public utility operating property, and net taxable income. 
MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 5-202(a)(8) (1989). Section 5-202(b)(3) provides that, 
to be eligible to receive the state's share of basic current expenses, the district's 
governing body "shall levy an annual tax sufficient to provide an amount of 
revenue for elementary and secondary public education purposes equal to the 
product of the wealth of the county and a local contribution rate determined 
for each fiscal year." 
Wealth per pupil in dollars by district for the 1989-90 school year was: 
1. Allegany $ 104,895 
2. Anne Arundel 164,782 
3. Baltimore City 101,246 
4. Baltimore County 219,877 
5. Calvert 183,315 
6. Caroline 89,048 
7. Carroll 125,797 
8. Cecil 102,234 
9. Charles 124,109 
10. Dorchester 115,981 
11. Frederick 126,188 
12. Garrett 97,297 
13. Harford 120,988 
14. Howard 195,827 
15. Kent 167,188 
16. Montgomery 283,757 
17. Prince George's 149,818 
18. Queen Anne's 159,842 
19. St. Mary's 114,069 
20. Somerset 87,347 
21. Talbot 277,195 
22. Washington 121,375 
23. Wicomico 117,568 
24. Worcester 358,708 
1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20. 
Section 5-202(b)(2) specifies that the shared basic current expense amount is to 
be calculated based upon a statewide aggregate of expenditures for basic current 
expenses during the third and fourth preceding fiscal years, divided by full-time 
students. To determine the counties' share of this amount, . section 5-202(b)(4) 
provides that the sum of the basic current expenses to be shared by all the counties 
shall be multiplied by 0.45 for the first $624. The amount exceeding $624 is then 
multiplied by 0.50, and the two products are added. Id. The resulting sum is divided 
by the sum of wealth of all the counties. Id. The resulting quotient, rounded to 
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is paid for by local school districts as a group.4a The actual percentage 
that each district must contribute each year toward its share of the 
foundation amount varies based upon the district's taxable wealth. 49 
The greater a district's taxable wealth, the greater its required con-
tribution to the foundation amount. 50 
Although the foundation amount is the only contribution to 
public school financing mandated by the General Assembly,SI it 
represents only a small fraction of the actual cost needed to educate 
an individual child. Because the State contributes only a percentage 
of the foundation amount, 52 the State, in essence, is contributing 
very little towards the overall amount needed to educate each child. 
Every district has found it necessary to spend considerably more per 
student each year than the foundation amount,S3 and it must do so 
at its own expense. For example, in 1989-90, the General Assembly 
set the foundation amount at $1999 per pupil. s4 The minimum amount 
actually spent that year by a district was $4,049 per student; the 
highest amount spent per student was $6,629.55 Thus, under Mary-
land's existing public school financing scheme, a district's public 
school financing is largely dependent upon its ability to raise local 
taxes. 56 State aid contributes very little. The dependence of public 
seven decimal places, and expressed as a percentage with five decimal places, is the 
local contribution rate. [d. The state's share of basic current expenses for each 
county is the difference between the county share as calculated above and the total 
basic current expenses. 
48. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 605, 458 A.2d at 762-63. 
49. See id. 
50. See id. 
51. See id. at 606, 458 A.2d at 763. 
52. See id. at 604, 458 A.2d at 762-63. 
53. See id. at 606-07, 458 A.2d 763-64. The Hornbeck court observed that: 
[T]he State share of basic current expenses in fiscal year 1980 amounted 
to $331,880,120, or 54 percent of the total; the local school districts 
appropriated $283,281,866, or 46 percent of the total basic current 
expenses .... 
[d. 
In addition to these educational expenditures, each local subdivision 
spends substantial sums of money for the support of its local schools. 
Because of differences in assessed property valuations among the 
subdivisions, the amounts raised through local taxation and spent per 
pupil vary from district to district, depending upon the district's tax 
wealth and/or inclination to spend money to enhance the educational 
resources and opportunities available to its students. These discretion-
ary local expenditures result in substantial spending imbalances be-
tween the districts - imbalances which are only partially offset by 
the State's equalization and other aid. 
54. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 5-202(b)(2)3(ii) (1989). 
55. See 1990 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20. 
56. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 606-07, 458 A.2d at 763-64. 
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school financing on local wealth results in disparities in the amount 
school districts can spend per student. For example, in 1987-88, 
$2,350 per student separated the lowest and highest spending districts, 
which equates to a difference of over $70,000 per classroom of 
thirty.s7 By 1990-91, this gap increased to $2,599 per student, or 
$77,970 per classroom of thirty.s8 
Under Maryland's existing public school financing scheme, this 
disparity between wealthy and poor school districts is growing. From 
the 1988-89 school year t6 the 1989-90 school year, the average of 
the bottom five counties fell $106 per pupil below the average of the 
top five counties.s9 In 1979-80, the poorest school district was able 
to spend only 61.3 percent as much as the wealthiest;60 in 1991, this 
figure dropped to only 59.4 percent.61 
It is clear that poorer school districts suffer under a public 
school financing scheme dependent upon local wealth62 because they 
have a limited tax base from which to raise revenues for education.63 
Additionally, many urban districts are affected by "municipal over-
burden," a condition in which the cost of local government, such as 
fire fighters, police officers, garbage collection and road maintenance, 
is so high that the district is either unwilling or unable to raise taxes 
further to support education.64 In general, poorer urban districts not 
only have greater school tax rates than wealthier districts, but total 
property tax rates usually exceed those in wealthier districts. 6S 
57. Miller, Funding Re/orm Top Priority 0/ Metro Education Coalition, Fall 1990 
MEC Newsletter, supra note 24, at 1. 
58. Report Card Gives Schools Credit For Trying Harder, The Baltimore Sun, 
Nov. 3, 1991 at AI, col.2 (reporting on the 1991 Maryland School Performance 
Program Report) (Baltimore City spends $4,614 per student, while Montgomery 
County spends $7,213). 
59. Spring 1991 MEC Newsletter, supra note 24, at 12. 
6O.Id. 
61. Id. 
62. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 608-14, 458 
A.2d 758, 764-67 (1983); Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 324-34, 575 A.2d 
359, 378-82 (1990); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 
(Tex. 1989). See generally Ratner, supra note 1. 
63. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 611-12, 458 A.2d at 766; Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d 
at 393; see also Briffault, supra note 22, at 20-21. 
64. See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 355-57, 575 A.2d at 393-94; see also Hornbeck, 295 
Md. at 609, 458 A.2d at 765; Briffault, supra note 22, at 20-21. 
65. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 613-14, 458 A.2d at 767. At trial in the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, Judge Ross stated that Baltimore City has less local 
revenue available for school financing because it must devote a greater share 
of its tax base and locally raised revenues to non school services. Although 
Judge Ross recognized the problem of municipal overburden, because he found 
the entire financing scheme unconstitutional, he did not address this issue. Id. 
See generally Briffault, supra note 22, at 19-20. 
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This condition is exemplified by Baltimore City. The total prop-
erty tax rate in Baltimore City is more than double that of any other 
county in the state.66 Although Baltimore City levies at a rate higher 
than any other district, it provides below average financing to its 
public schools.67 Thus the system of local financing is disproportion-
ately burdensome for the Baltimore City School District. 
Article VIII of the Maryland Constitution obligates the State, 
not the counties or B?.ltimore City, to provide financing for thorough 
and efficient schools.68 Because section 5-202(b) provides state finan-
cial assistance for only a portion of the legislatively required foun-
dation amount, and each district annually spends at least twice the 
foundation amount per pUpil,69 the General Assembly has, in effect, 
abdicated its constitutional obligation to provide by taxation or 
otherwise for the maintenance of a thorough and efficient system of 
public schools.70 
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board oj Education was the first 
challenge to the constitutionality of section 5-202(b). In Hornbeck, 
the boards of education of Somerset, Caroline, and St. Mary's 
counties, and the school commissioners of Baltimore City, together 
with taxpayers, students, parents, public officials, and school super-
intendents, claimed that Maryland's public school financing scheme 
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, 
the equal protection guarantee of article XXIV of the Maryland 
66. MARYLAND ASS'N OF COUNTIES, PROPERTY TAX RATES ·IN MARYLAND'S SUBDI-
VISIONS, 1987-1991 (1991). 
67. [d.; see Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 610, 458 A.2d at 765. From fiscal year 1986-
87 to fiscal year 1990-91, Baltimore City increased its general fund contribution 
to schools by 47.8 percent, far more than the 23.3 percent increase in the city's 
total budget. Spring 1991 MEC Newsletter, supra note 24, at 12. In contrast 
during the same four year period, the state increased its aid to schools by only 
30.7 percent, while it increased the state's total general fund budget by 38.8 
percent. [d. 
68. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 631 nn. 11 & 12, 458 A.2d at 776 nn. 11 & 12; see 
also BriffauJt, supra note 22, at 23 (noting that where local government is 
accountable to the state, the state is more vulnerable to legal attack). 
69. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 606-07, 609, 458 A.2d at 763-65; 1990 & 1991 
MSPP REPORTS, supra note 20. 
70. In practical terms, the state contribution to basic current educational expenses 
accounts for less than half the amount spent per student. See Hornbeck, 295 
Md. at 606, 458 A.2d at 763. Maryland, "the eighth richest state in the 
nation," is "42nd in its monetary contribution to public education." Miller, 
Funding Rejorm Top Priority oj Metro Education Coalition, Fall 1990 MEC 
Newsletter, supra note 24, at 1. The average state public school financing 
scheme relied on state revenues to provide 49.8 percent of its budget for the 
1986-87 fiscal year. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1989, at 149. 
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Declaration of Rights, and section one of article VIII of the Maryland 
Constitution.71 
The plaintiffs alleged that Maryland's public school financing 
scheme resulted in discriminatory, unequal and inadequate financing 
that left the plaintiff school boards unable to meet the constitutionally 
mandated level of adequate education.72 As evidence that Maryland's 
public school financing scheme was unconstitutional as applied to 
students in poorer districts, to poor students throughout the State, 
and in particular to students in Baltimore City, the plaintiffs pointed 
to wide disparities in the taxable wealth among the various school 
districts, and the effect of those differences upon the ability of the 
poorer school districts to provide their stud~nts with educational 
offerings and resources comparable to those of the wealthier school 
districts.73 
At trial in the Circuit Court of Baltimore . City, 74 the Honorable 
David Ross found from the evidence that: 
[T]he present financing scheme significantly underfunds the 
plaintiffs' schools whose requirements are at least as great 
as any in the State, while it permits virtually unlimited 
spending in other subdivisions. As a result the quality of 
the schools in plaintiffs' subdivisions is inferior to those in 
the wealthier subdivisions with respect to the buildings, 
equipment, materials and staff. 75 
Judge Ross found that the General Assembly had failed to set 
qualitative standards for public school education, and held that article 
V~II required the public school system to be "full, complete and 
effective by contemporary standards throughout the State. "76 Because 
Judge Ross found that section 5-202(b) did not provide the means 
to achieve the constitutionally mandated standard of education, he 
held that Maryland's public school financing scheme did not comply 
with the thorough and efficient clause of article VIII of the Maryland 
Constitution.77 
Judge Ross further held that, under article XXIV of the Mary-
land Constitution, mathematical equality among pupils with respect 
to public school financing was required. 78 Because he found that 
71. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 607, 458 A.2d at 764. 
72. Id. at 608, 458 A.2d at 764. 
73. Id. at 603, 458 A.2d at 761-62. 
74. See id. at 611-19, 458 A.2d at 766-70. 
75. Id. at 616, 458 A.2d at 768. 
76. Id. Judge Ross found the words "thorough and efficient" unambiguous, and 
stated that the standard must be established and maintained in every district. 
Id. at 615, 458 A.2d at 768. 
77. Id. at 616, 458 A.2d at 768. 
78. Id. at 618-19, 458 A.2d at 769-70. 
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section 5-202(b) did not provide adequate and equal financing for 
each pupil in the state,79 Judge Ross held that the entire public school 
financing scheme violated the equal protection guarantee of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights.sO 
Responding to the State's 'petition for certiorari,S) the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland recognized that Maryland's public school financ-
ing scheme is dependent on local revenues and spending choices, which 
results in undeniable demographic and environmental disadvantages to 
children who reside in poorer school districts.s2 The court held, however, 
that inequities in Maryland's public school financing scheme did not 
violate the equal protection guarantees of dther the fourteenth 
amendmentS3 or article XXIV of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.84 
The court determined that, in the absence of a suspect classificationsS 
79.Id. 
80.Id. 
81. The court of appeals granted certiorari prior to a decision in the case by the 
court of special appeals. Id. at 601, 458 A.2d at 758. 
82. Id. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780. 
83. Id. at 642, 458 A.2d at 782. 
84. Id.at 650, 458 A.2d at 786. 
85. Id. at 652, 458 A.2d at 787 (noting that the Supreme Court has yet to hold 
that financial status alone creates a suspect class). 
In Serrano v. Priest, 5. Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 
(1971), the Supreme Court of California recognized that no direct authority 
existed for the proposition that education is a fundamental interest which may 
not be conditioned on wealth. Id. at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 
615. The court noted that wealth classifications have been invalidated only in 
conjunction with the rights of criminal defendants and voting rights. Id. The 
Serrano court did, however find persuasive the Supreme Court's decision in 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 395 U.S. 618 (1969). Id. at 604 n.22, 487 P.2d at 1255 
n.22, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615 n.22. The Serrano court indicated in dictum that 
certain wealth discrimination in the area of education would be unconstitutional: 
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal 
integrity of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit its 
expenditures, whether for public assistance, public education, or any 
other program. But a State may not accomplish such a purpose by 
invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. It could not, for 
example, reduce expenditures for education by barring indigent chil-
dren from school. 
Id. (quoting Shapiro at 633). Although the Shapiro decision referred to actual 
exclusion from school, the Serrano court found the same constitutional principle 
applies to discrimination in expenditures for education. Id. In support of this 
conclusion, the Serrano court pointed to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964), in which the Court asserted 
that the right to. vote is impaired not only when the qualified individual is 
barred from voting, but also when the impact of his ballot is diminished by 
unequal electoral apportionment. Id. at 607 n.24, 487 P.2d 1257 n.24, 96 Cal. 
Rptr. 617 n.24. Furthermore, the Serrano court noted that in Hargrove v. 
Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (1970) (on remand from the Fifth Circuit), a three 
judge panel held a Florida statute, which limited the local property tax rate 
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or impingement upon a fundamental right,86 the constitutionality of 
Maryland's public school financing scheme was presumed. 87 Finding 
that the financing scheme neither impinged upon a fundamental right 
nor utilized a suspect classification, the court applied the rational basis 
test, which invalidates a statutory classification only if the statute uses 
a classification which is wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a 
legitimate state purpose.88 The Hornbeck court found that Maryland's 
public school financing scheme, though patently dependent upon local 
wealth, reasonably furthered the legitimate state purpose of effectuating 
the tradition of local control over the operation of schools. 89 
which a county could levy in raising school revenue, unconstitutional under 
traditional equal protection analysis because there was no rational basis for its 
discriminatory effect on poor counties. The Hargrove court therefore declined 
to determine whether education was a fundamental interest. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court vacated the opinion on other grounds but indicated that on 
remand the court should fully explore the equal protection issue. Serrano at 
604 n.22, 487 P.2d at 1255 n.22, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615 n.22. Recognizing that 
these cases had precedential value only in the context of racial segregation or 
total exclusion from school, the Serrano court nonetheless found them relevant 
in considering the importance of education. Id. at 605 n.23, 487 P.2d at 1256 
n.23, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617 n.23. 
Furthermore, the Serrano court found a comparison of the importance of 
the right to education with the rights of defendants in criminal cases helpful 
in reaching its constitutional conclusion. Id. at 607, 487 P.2d at 1257-58, 96 
Cal. Rptr. at 617-18. The court recognized that: 
[E]ducation may have a far greater social significance than a free 
transcript or a court appointed lawyer. • [E]ducation not only affects 
directly a vastly greater number of persons than the criminal law, but 
it affects them in ways which - to the state - have an enormous and 
much more varied significance. Aside from reducing the crime rate 
(the inverse relation is strong), education also supports each and every 
other value of democratic society-participation, communication, and 
social mobility, to name but a few.' 
Id. (quoting Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable 
Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. REv. 305, 362-
63 (1969». 
In reaching the conclusion that education must be treated as a fundamental 
interest, the Serrano court also recognized the pervasive impact of education. 
The court noted that, unlike other government services, every person benefits 
from education, and few other services involve such sustained contact with the 
recipient. Id. at 609, 487 P .2d 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. 619. Indeed, "a child of 
the poor assigned willy-nilly to an inferior state school takes on the complexion 
of a prisoner, complete with a minimum sentence of 12. years." Id. at 610, 
487 P.2d 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. 619 (quoting Coon et aI., supra, at 388). 
86. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 645, 458 A.2d at 783; c/. supra note l. 
87. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 642, 458 A.2d at 782. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 654, 458 A.2d at 788. But c/. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 
777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1989). The Edgewood court stated: 
Some have argued that reform in school finance will eliminate local 
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The court of appeals also flatly rejected the proposition that article 
VIII mandates exact equality of per pupil financing as the required 
means of establishing a thorough and efficient statewide system of 
public schools.90 The issue in Hornbeck, as framed by the court of 
appeals, was not "whether there are great disparities in educational 
opportunities among the State's school districts," but rather, whether 
the same mathematically precise amount of money was required to be 
spent on each child's education, or whether any county was prohibited 
from spending more.9J The court of appeals found that no such 
requirement existed under either the federal or state constitution, and 
thus held that no constitutional violation had occurred.92 The court 
stated that, in light of historical evidence, the words "thorough and 
efficient" found in article VIII are not the equivalent of "uniform."93 
The court concluded that any equality component of the "thorough 
and efficient" language of article VIII is limited to requiring the General 
Assembly to provide a basic or adequate education to the State's 
children.94 
In addition to recognizing the General Assembly's affirmative 
obligation under article VIII to provide a basic or adequate public 
education, the court further explained that it was the responsibility of 
the General Assembly, not the courts, to determine the quantity and 
quality of educational opportunities available to Maryland school chil-
dren.9s The court found that the General Assembly had established 
such statewide qualitative standards pursuant to the Education Article 
of the Maryland Code and the state regulatory scheme.96 The Hornbeck 
court noted that the General Assembly was making continuous efforts 
control, but this argument has no merit. An efficient system does not 
preclude the ability of communities to exercise local control over the 
education of their children. It requires only that the funds available 
for education be distributed equitably and evenly. An efficient system 
will actually allow for more local control, not less. It will provide 
property-poor districts with economic alternatives that are not now 
available to them. Only if alternatives are indeed availlible can a 
community exercise the control of making choices. 
[d. The Hornbeck court recognized this argument but found it unpersuasive 
under the rational basis test. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 656, 485 A.2d 789-
90. At least one commentator argues that local autonomy is actually central 
to preventing greater equality. See Briffault, supra note 22, at 5, 23-39 
(discussing the history of public school financing cases. and the interest of local 
autonomy). 
90. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780. 
91. [d. at 658, 458 A.2d at 790. 
92. [d. at 640-57, 458 A.2d at 780-90. 
93. [d. at 631, 458 A.2d at 776. 
94. [d. at 631-32, 458 A.2d at 776-77. 
95. [d. at 658-59, 458 A.2d at 790. 
96. [d. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780 (citing the Education Article of the Maryland 
Code and COMAR Title 13A). 
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to provide school children with a thorough and efficient education,97 
and made clear that it would not interfere with the General Assembly's 
methods of solving educational problems so long as constitutional 
mandates were met. 98 
The Hornbeck court found that the plaintiffs had failed even to 
allege that statewide qualitative standards of education were not being 
met.99 Thus, while there was abundant evidence to support the prop-
osition that Maryland's public school financing scheme fostered unequal 
educational opportunities among children throughout the state,IOO the 
court found that, under the facts presented, no child in the state was 
significantly deprived of the right to an adequate education as prescribed 
by article VIII of the Maryland Constitution. 101 Under this rationale, 
when there is no demonstration that the General Assembly has failed 
to fulfill its obligation under article VIII to provide for an adequate 
education, a constitutional challenge to Maryland's public school fi-
nancing scheme cannot be maintained simply by showing that the 
educational resources available. in poorer school districts are inferior to 
those in the wealthier districts. 102 
The Hornbeck court established that, in order to sustain an article 
VIII constitutional challenge to the State's public school financing 
scheme, the very least that is required is an evidentiary showing that 
schools in any district fail to provide an adequate education, as 
measured by contemporary educational standards. 103 The court further 
indicated that, should the qualitative educational standards established 
by the General Assemblyl()4 not be met, or should the State's public 
school financing scheme fail to provide each school district with the 
means essential to provide the basic education contemplated by the 
thorough and efficient clause of article VIII of the Maryland Consti-
tution, the possibility exists that Maryland's existing public school 
financing scheme could be found unconstitutional. lOS 
III. NEW EVIDENCE OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION 
SERVES TO REVIVE A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGE TO MARYLAND'S PUBLIC SCHOOL 
FINANCING SCHEME BASED ON LOCAL WEALTH 
In the nine years since Hornbeck, it has become increasingly 
apparent that public school financing schemes that are dependent 
97. Id. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780. 
98. Id. at 658-59, 458 A.2d at 790. 
99. Id. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780. 
100. Id. at 611-16, 458 A.2d at 766-68. 
101. Id. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780. 
102. Id. But ct. Biegel, supra note 1 (discussing heightened review of equal education 
opportunity). 
103. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780. 
104. Id. See generally 1990 & 1991 MSPP REPORTS, supra note 20. 
105. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780. 
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upon local wealth do not provide poorer school districts with the 
means to provide adequate education. I06 The discriminatory effect of 
public school financing schemes based on local wealth has been well 
documented. I07 Moreover, disparity in educational opportunity has 
been recognized in several jurisdictions as evidence that public school 
financing schemes dependent upon local wealth fail to provide stu-
dents in poorer school districts with a thorough and efficient public 
education, that is, an effective education in the basic skills necessary 
to compete in the job market and participate responsibly in the 
democratic process .108 
In 1989, primarily due to concern on the part of Maryland 
Governor William Donald Schaefer that the structure and procedures 
106. See supra note 21. For examples of successful court challenges prior to 
Hornbeck, see Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979) and 
Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (en 
banc). Both courts defined the constitutional duty in terms of results, i.e., the 
, school must provide education which enables students to adequately participate 
in the democratic, and economic system. 
107. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 196-99 (Ky. 1989); 
Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 295, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (1990); Robinson v. 
Cahill, 1I8 N.J. Super. 223, 236-256, 287 A.2d 187, 194-204, afl'd on rehearing, 
119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972), modified, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 
273 (Robinson l), afl'd on rehearing, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (Robinson Il), 
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 
S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989); see also Briffault, supra note 22, at 19-21. 
Studies also show that public schools with predominantly minority students 
particularly suffer from lower quality education, due to the relative indifference, 
of school boards to these schools. See Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City v. 
Dowell, III S. Ct. 630, 643 n.5 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice 
Marshall points out in the context of desegregation, the poor quality of a 
school system may be so severe that substantial reform is required. Id. (citing 
Jenkins'v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1301-1307 (8th Cir. 1988), afl'd in part 
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 495 U.S. 33 (1990». 
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), held that higher per 
pupil expenditures in schools predominantly serving white students than in 
schools with black students deprived the District of Columbia's black and poor 
public school children of their right to equal educational opportunity with the 
district's more affluent white children. The court stated: 
If the situation were one involving racial imbalance but in some 
facility other than public schools, or unequal educational opportunity 
but without [racial] or poverty aspects (e.g. unequal schools all within 
an economically homogeneous white suburb), it might be pardonable 
to uphold the practice on a minimal showing of rational basis. But 
the fusion of these two elements in de facto segregation in public 
schools irresistibly calls for additional justification. What supports 
this case is ... the degree to which the poor and [minorities] must 
rely on the public schools in rescuing themselves from their depressed 
culture and economic condition. 
Id. at 508. 
108. See supra note I and accompanying text; see also Ratner, supra note I, at 
787-794. 
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of the Maryland public school system were inefficient, the state's 
Department of Education created the Maryland School Performance 
Program (MSPP) to evaluate public school performance. I09 The State 
Board of Education initiated the MSPP with the goal of achieving 
an effective system of public education by the year 1995.110 The 
purpose of the MSPP is to provide each student with the opportunity 
to graduate from Maryland public schools with the information and 
skills necessary to participate in a world economy, function as a 
responsible citizen in a democratic society, and achieve a personally 
satisfying and fulfilling life. III 
As a first step toward improving the way Maryland educates its 
children, the State Board of Education approved standards by which 
to measure the performance of public schools.1I2 Under the MSPP, 
school performance is evaluated by measuring the results of the 
education process, i.e., actual student performance, rather than fo-
cusing on the efforts made to educate.1I3 Excellent school performance 
is defined as "a highly challenging and clearly exemplary level of 
achievement, indicating outstanding accomplishment in meeting the 
needs of students."114 Satisfactory performance is defined as "a 
realistic and rigorous level of achievement indicating proficiency in 
meeting the needs of students. " liS School performance is measured 
by the percentage of a district's. students who meet certain basic 
levels of achievement in eight specific areas of performanceY6 The 
State Board of Education approved these specific areas of student 
109. See The Baltimore Sun, Nov. 20, 1990, at AI, col. 1. The Governor and the 
General Assembly complained that the school districts "constantly ask for 
money without offering evidence that appropriated funds are used wisely." [d. 
110. 1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at iii. 
111. [d. 
112. [d. The State Superintendent of Schools has expressly stated that the State 
Board of Education believes that "public education must ensure success for 
all students." [d. (emphasis in original). The MSPP was founded on the belief 
that "all children can learn," that "[a]1I children have the right to attend 
[public] schools in which they can progress and learn," and that "[a]1I children 
shall have a real opportunity to learn equally rigorous content." [d. 
113. See id.; see also Ratner, supra note 1, at 787-94. Ratner also points to the 
"new catechism of urban school improvement" developed by the late Professor 
Ronald Edmonds of Michigan State University which has as its characteristics: 
(1) the principal's leadership and attention to the quality of instruction; 
(2) a pervasive and broadly understood instructional focus; (3) an 
orderly, safe climate conducive to teaching and learning; (4) teacher 
behaviors that convey the expectation that all students are expected 
to obtain at least minimum mastery; and (5) the use of measures of 
pupil achievement as the basis for program evaluation. 
[d. at 801. 
114. 1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 5. 
115. [d. 
116. [d. at 2. See Ratner, supra note 1, at 785-94. 
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performance because they are "essential tools for measuring how 
well schools, school systems, and the State are preparing every student 
for higher education and successful careers, and how well they are 
educating every student."lI7 The eight performance areas are sepa-
rated into three categories: assessed knowledge, student attainment, 
and student participation. The specific standards are set forth below. 
ASSESSED KNOWLEDGE 
Measured by the percentage of 9th grade students who 
passed minimum competency tests in basic skills. In the 
areas of reading, writing, and mathematics, these tests meas-
















Measured by the percentage of students who advance to a 
higher grade or instructional level at the end of the year in 






Measured by yearly attendance and dropout rates. 





Yearly dropout rates for grades 9 through 12: 
117. 1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 1. 
118. See School Grading May Revive Funding Suit, The Baltimore Sun, Nov. 20, 
1990, at A12, col. 4. 
119. 1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 5. 
120. [d. 






Applying these performance standards, the State Board of Ed-
ucation issued Maryland's first outcome-based report on the per-
formance of public schools in November of 1990.122 This report was 
based on school performance for the 1989-90 school year and presents 
data on student performance, for which schools, school systems, and 
the State are held responsible. 123 In addition to evidence of wide 
disparities in spending and educational opportunity, the 1990 MSPP 
Report gives children in the Baltimore City School District what the 
plaintiffs in Hornbeck did not have - evidence that Maryland's 
existing public school financing scheme fails to provide an adequate 
education to school children in all districts, as measured by contem-
porary statewide qualitative standards. l24 
According to the 1990 MSPP Report, none of the Maryland 
school districts met satisfactory standards in all the performance 
areas measured. J2S Statewide, the public school system passed in only 
two performance areas: Student Participation as measured by the 
yearly attendance rate in grades 1-6, and Student Attainment as 
measured by the number of students promoted from one grade to 
the next, for grades 1-6. 126 The Maryland public schools failed to 
meet satisfactory performance in any area of Assessed Knowledge. 127 
The State Board of Education released its second· school per-
formance report on November 12, 1991.128 The 1991 MSPP Report, 
based on the 1990-91 school year, shows that the performance among 
students taking minimum competency tests in Assessed Knowledge is 
not improving. 129 Statewide, standards again were not met in any 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at iii. 
124. See School Grading May Revive Funding Suit, The Baltimore Sun, Nov. 20, 
1990, at A12, col. 4. 
125. See Md. Issues 'Report Card' on Schools, The Baltimore Sun, Nov. 20, 1990, 
at AI, col. 1. 
126. 1990 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 8. Maryland's students' satisfactory 
participation and advancement in the early years, contrasted with their failure 
to achieve basic competency levels in the ninth grade seems to indicate that 
there is little correlation between student advancement and achievement of 
basic competency. Because students' performance worsens the longer they stay 
in school, it seems that the Maryland public school system is failing to meet 
the needs of its students. 
127. Id. 
128. 1991 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20. 
129. Id. at 10. 
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area of Assessed Knowledge. 130 Ninety-eight percent of elementary 
school students, however, were promoted from one grade to the 
next, resulting in an excellent promotion rate for the State. l3l Yet, 
as measured by 9th and 10th graders taking minimum competency 
tests in Assessed Knowledge for the first time, only the Cecil County 
district met minimum standards in Reading, Writing and Math.132 
The 1991 MSPP Report also indicates that, for the second year 
in a row, 11 th graders in eight districts failed to meet state minimum 
competency standards in Assessed Knowledge as measured at about 
the eighth grade level. 133 The districts failing minimum competency 
standards in Assessed Knowledge for second time test-takers were: 
Baltimore City, and Prince George's, Caroline, St. Mary's, Somerset, 
Talbot, and Garrett counties. l34 In 1983, four of these districts were 
among the plaintiffs in Hornbeck. 13S Ironically, with the exception 
of Baltimore City, all of the districts failing minimum competency 
standards in Assessed Knowledge at the high school level had excellent 
or satisfactory promotion from one grade to the next at the elemen-
tary school level,136 
The 1990 MSPP Report evidences that, in school districts where 
more money is available, students are likely to perform better .137 The 
130. [d. 
131. [d. 
132. [d. at 26. 
133. [d. 
134. [d. at 16, 22-52. 
135. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. 597,458 A.2d 758 (Somerset, Caroline, and St. Mary's 
counties, and the School Commissioners of Baltimore City). 
136. 1991 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 22, 28, 34, 44, 48, SO, 52. 
137. See School 'Grading' Only a First Step, The Baltimore Evening Sun, Nov. 20, 
1990, at 01, col. 4 (quoting State School Superintendent Shilling as stating 
that issuing the performance data means thCit "we're going to be in a position 
to show how money makes a difference, and be able to show improved student 
achievement"). 
While there is no simple correlation between dollars spent and achievement, 
educational experts answer the question of whether money can make a differ-
ence in the affirmative. Robert E. Slavin, Center for Research on Effective 
Schooling for Disadvantaged Students, Johns Hopkins University, states that 
many programs and practices, which cost money to implement, have been 
shown to have positive effects on student achievement. Spring 1991 MEC 
Newsletter, supra note 24, at 3-4. Slavin points out that some of the best 
researched and proven programs and practices which translate increased fi-
nancing into effective education for children include: (I) Early Education -
good quality preschool and extended day kindergarten programs are known to 
"markedly increase" the chances of students' success by providing the language 
and school skills necessary so that disadvantaged children do not fall behind 
in early grades; for example, Maryland's own Success for All program, also 
used in other states, which uses preschool, extended-day kindergarten, one-to-
one tutoring, family support services, and staff development, has been found 
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Anne Arundel County School District, for example, spent $4,889 per 
student in 1989-90 and passed in only two performance areas. 138 The 
Baltimore County School District spent $5,722 per student and passed 
in four performance areas. 139 The Howard County School District 
spent $5,549 per student, and passed in seven out of the eight 
performance areas. l40 
. When compared to wealthier school districts, the performance 
of Baltimore City schools is especially inadequate. The poorer urban 
Baltimore City School District, which was able to spend only $4,255 
per student in 1989-90,141 and $4,614 per student in 1990-91,142 failed 
in every area of Assessed Knowledge measured by the 1990 MSPP. 
Therefore, students in Baltimore City as a whole have not achieved 
the basic competency in mathematics, writing, citizenship and reading 
required for graduation from high school in Maryland. 143 
In examining the failure of the Maryland public school system 
to provide adequate education to children throughout the state, it is 
important to recognize the disparity in the degree of inadequacies 
to ensure that virtually all children, regardless of home background, achieve 
success in reading; (2) Staff Development and Curriculum - increasing the 
effectiveness of today's teachers in the classroom has the most impact in the 
near term; (3) Improving Teacher Quality - over the long term, underfunded 
school districts will never employ the best teachers unless they have the funds 
to attract and retain them; (4) Improving Library Services - research shows 
that children learn to read by reading what is interesting to them; extracurricular 
reading is essential to an effective reading program and children must have 
access to extensive libraries with trained librarians who are able to coordinate 
students and teachers with an adequate number, variety and quality of reading 
material; (5) Improving Family Support Services - because many family prob-
lems impact on a child's educational success, someone at the school must make 
sure that students attend school, have eyeglasses and other health care, and to 
involve parents in support of their children's success; (6) Improving Access to 
Advanced Coursework - in a concern for students at risk, disadvantaged school 
districts often are unable to provide advanced placement courses for students 
who need them; (7) Improving Vocational and Technical Education - vocational 
and technical education in underfunded districts is inadequate to prepare 
students for today's job market; in order for the money spent on such programs 
to be worthwhile, higher quality technical and vocational education, including 
providing all high school students with some degree of computer literacy is 
imperative. Id. Slavin conCludes that Baltimore City is clearly deficient in a 
broad range of services to students and states that "if students in poorer 
districts are to have any chance to meet the high and comprehensive perform-
ance standards established by the State of Maryland, there is no question but 
that major additional funds will be needed." Id. at 4. 
138. 1990 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 12-13. 
139. Id. at 16-17. 
140. [d. at 36-37. 
141. [d. at 14-15. 
142. 1991 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 17. 
143. See 1990 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 2. 
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among the districts. l44 For the 1989-90 school year, in the Baltimore 
City School District only 43.30/0 of students passed mathematics, 
67.3% passed writing, 61.4% passed citizenship, and 85% passed 
reading. 145 While the Anne Arundel County School District achieved 
satisfactory performance in student participation for attendance in 
grades 1-6, and excellent performance for the number of students 
promoted to the next grade level, it was also very close to meeting 
satisfactory performance. l46 The Anne Arundel School District missed 
yearly attendance in grades 7-12 by only 1.6%, reading by 1.1 %, 
mathematics by 8.3%, writing by 4% and citizenship by 14.6%.J4' 
The dropout rate for Anne Arundel high school students, however, 
was an unsatisfactory 5.9%.148 Similarly, the Baltimore County School 
District passed reading, writing, and student participation in grades 
1-6, and achieved excellent performance in the promotion rate for 
grades 1_6. 149 The district barely missed satisfactory performance in 
other areas: attendance in grades 7-12 by only 1.3%, mathematics 
by 2.8%, and citizenship by 4.5%.150 Although the dropout rate in 
Baltimore County was over one and one-half times higher than 
satisfactory, at 4.8%, this rate is more than 20% lower than the 
dropout rate in Anne Arundel County, and 75% lower than the 
dropout rate in Baltimore City. lSI In Howard County, the only 
performance standard not met was attendance in grades 7-12, which 
was missed by only 1 % .152 
The disparity in the degree of inadequacies is particularly striking 
when the Baltimore City and Montgomery County school districts 
are compared. As the wealthiest district, Montgomery County was 
able to spend $6,629 per student in 1989-90, and obtained satisfactory 
achievement in all the basic skills tested: 1S3 80.3% of the students in 
that district passed mathematics, 92.2% passed writing and 95.3% 
144. See Ratner, supra note 1. 
145. 1990 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 40. In 1990-91, Baltimore City's 
performance remained unsatisfactory, with a decline of about 5 points in 
Writing and Citizenship, and only slight improvement in mathematics and 
reading: 44.3 percent of students passed mathematics, 62.4 percent passed 
writing, 57.1 percent passed citizenship, and 86.1 percent passed reading. 1991 
MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 16. 
146. 1990 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 12. 
147. [d. 
148. [d. 
149. [d. at 16. 
150. [d. 
151. [d. at 12, 14, 16. 
152. [d. at 36. 
153. [d. at 40-41. Montgomery County students were not tested on citizenship 
because the students in that district would not have been first time test takers 
on that subject. [d. at 40. 
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passed reading. 154 The only performance standard not met by the 
Montgomery County School District was attendance in grades 7-12.155 
Scoring 92.1070, the district missed satisfactory performance in this 
area by only 1.9% .156 In comparison, the Baltimore City School 
District also failed attendance in grades 7-12, but missed satisfactory 
performance by a significant 14.6%.157 In addition, the dropout rate 
in the Montgomery County School District was a mere 2.9%;158 in 
Baltimore City the dropout rate was more than six times as great at 
18.8%y9 
The 1991 MSPP Report shows that "Baltimore City continues 
to exist in a category all its own."I60 According to the 1991 MSPP 
Report, Baltimore City was the only district to fail all four areas of 
Assessed Knowledge and elementary promotion. 161 The Anne Arundel 
and Somerset districts also failed all four areas of Assessed Knowl-
edge; however, they both achieved excellent and satisfactory elemen-
tary promotion rates. l62 Although the 1991 MSPP Report indicates 
that Baltimore City's dropout rate declined from 18.8% to 10.3%, 
city officials believe the actual figure should be 14.6%.163 
154. Id. at 40. In 1990-91, Montgomery County showed slight improvement in 
mathematics and reading, but fell below satisfactory by 2 percent in writing: 
81.1 percent of the students passed mathematics, 88.0 percent passed writing, 
85.0 percent passed citizenship and 96.0 percent passed reading. 1991 MSPP 
REpORT, supra note 20, at 42. 
155. 1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 40. 
156. Id. In 1990-91 attendance in grades 7-12 was slightly improved in Montgomery 
County at 92.5 percent. 1991 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 42. 
157. 1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 14. In 1990-91, Baltimore City had a 
79.4 percent attendance rate in grades 7-12. 1991 MSPP REpORT, supra note 
20, at 16. 
158. 1990 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 40. In 1990-91, Montgomery County's 
dropout rate improved to 2.1 percent. 1991 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 
42. 
159. 1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 14. Baltimore City's highest score, 
91.1 "10 was in the promotion rate of children in grades 1-6. Id. at 40. The 
drastic change in student participation between elementary school and high 
school may be attributed to a failure of the system. See Robinson v. Cahill, 
118 N.J. Super. 223, 251-52, 287 A.2d 187,202, a/I'd on rehearing, 119 N.J. 
Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972), modified, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (Robinson 
I), aff'd on rehearing, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (Robinson 11), cert.denied, 
414 U.S. 976 (1973). In 1990-91, Baltimore City's dropout rate showed im-
provement at 10.3%, 1991 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 16, although city 
officials believe that figure should be higher. Report Card Gives Schools Credit 
For Trying Harder, The Baltimore Sun, Nov. 3, 1991, at lA, col. 2. 
160. Report Card Gives Schools Credit For Trying Harder, The Baltimore Sun, 




Baltimore Law Review (Vol. 20 
The Baltimore City School District's continued unsatisfactory 
performance can be explained, in part, by its demographics and by 
the lesser amount of money it spends per student compared with 
wealthier districts such as Montgomery County.l64 In 1990-91, Bal-
timore City was able to spend only $4,614 per student, while Mont-
gomery County spent over $7,000 per student. 165 Of Baltimore City'S 
108,000 students, over half live in poverty. 166 
The performance of Baltimore City, particularly as compared to 
the wealthier districts, shows that the General Assembly has failed 
to meet its constitutional obligation to provide an adequate statewide 
public education. The Hornbeck court held that the constitutional 
obligation to provide an adequate education does not require the 
General Assembly to finance and operate the public school system 
uniformly in every district. 167 However, where the General Assembly 
has failed to finance a public school system sufficient for· students 
in all districts to meet even the State's own qualitative standards of 
basic education,l68 there can be little doubt that compliance with the 
"thorough and efficient" clause of article VIII has not been met. 
III. COMPARISON OF MARYLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
STANDARD OF ADEQUATE EDUCATION WITH OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS INDICATES THAT PUBLIC SCHOOL 
FINANCING BASED ON LOCAL WEALTH IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO MEET THE CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED LEVEL 
OF EDUCATION. 
Recent decisions in other jurisdictions confirm that public school 
financing schemes based on local wealth fail to provide an adequate 
public education throughout the state. The Hornbeck court consid-
ered cases from other jurisdictions with state constitutions containing 
a "thorough and efficient" education clause or like provision. 169 The 
164. See id. 
165. See id. 
166. See id. 
167. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 631-39, 458 A.2d 
758, 776-80 (1983). 
168. Cf. id. 
169. Id. at 632-39, 458 A.2d at 776-80. Forty-nine state constitutions contain some 
type of education clause mandating that the state maintain a free public 
education. Note, To Render them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional 
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 
1662 n.102 (1989) (citing Ratner, A New Legal Duty For Urban Public Schools: 
Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REv. 777, 814 n.138 (1985». 
State education clauses can be divided into four different categories. Id. at 
1662-70. In contrast to the last three categories, the first category of state 
education clauses provide only for a free system of public schools, without 
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court· correctly read these cases as supporting its holding that a 
any mention of standard of quality whatsoever. Id. at 1662 n.107. Challenges 
to public school financing under Category I education clauses have, for varying 
reasons, been rejected by state courts. Id. Under Category I education clauses, 
apparently, the state mandate is met so long as the state establishes some 
system of free public schools. Id. 
In Board of Education v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 
N.Y.S.2d 359 (1982); appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal 
question, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983), the New York Court of Appeals interpreted a 
Category I education clause. It held that the education article of the New York 
Constitution, which requires that the legislature "provide for the maintenance 
and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of 
this state may be educated," was satisfied, as there existed a "system of free 
schools" which offered a "sound basic education" to the state's children. Id. 
at 47-49, 439 N.E.2d 368-69, 453 N.Y .S.2d 643. The court found no support 
in either the language of the constitution or the historical documentation of 
the 1894 New York Constitutional Convention to support the contention that 
the education article required equality of education throughout the state. Id. 
Maryland's education clause falls under the second category of state 
education clauses. Note, To Render Them Safe, supra, at 1663 n.llO. Category 
II clauses mandate that the system of public schools meet a certain minimum 
standard of quality, such as "thorough and efficient." Id. at 1663. Nineteen 
states have Category II education clauses. Id. at 1663 n.llO. In addition to 
Maryland, five states have "thorough and efficient" clauses: Minnesota, New 
Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia; three states require "thorough" 
systems: Colorado, Idaho, and Montana; and five states require "efficient" 
systems: Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, and Texas. [d. at n.III. Five 
other Category II states do not have language specifically using either "thor-
ough" or "efficient": Florida, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
Id. Virginia, for example, calls for "an educational program of high quality." 
Id. 
In 1979, the West Virginia Supreme Court set the benchmark for a 
thorough and efficient public school system in Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 
672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979). It held that education is a fundamental right under 
the state equality provisions, and stated that a thorough and efficient public 
school system "develops, as best the state of education expertise allows, the 
minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful 
and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so economically." 
Id. at 705, 255 S.E.2d at 877. According to the Pauley court, a thorough and 
efficient education is one that encompasses the development of: (1) literacy; 
(2) basic math skills; (3) the ability to make informed political choices; (4) the 
ability to understand the life choices available; (5) vocational training; (6) 
knowledge of recreational pursuits; (7) knowledge of the creative arts such as 
music, literature, and theater; and (8) social ethics. Id. at 707, 255 S.E.2d at 
878. 
In Hornbeck, the Court of Appeals of Maryland distinguished Pauley on 
the ground that, at the time the case was decided, West Virginia, like New 
Jersey, had not "established comprehensive statewide qualitative standards 
governing all facets of the educational process in the State's public elementary 
and secondary schools," by legislation, regulations and bylaws adopted by the 
State Board of Education. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780. See 
infra notes 201-254 and accompanying text for a discussion of education 
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thorough and efficient system of schools does not require uniform 
financing in New Jersey. 
Eight states have Category III education clauses. Note, To Render Them 
Safe, supra, at 1666 n.118. Category III education clauses appear to impose 
greater obligations on the state than Category II clauses. [d. at 1667. But 
because these clauses have yet to be interpreted by state courts in the context 
of public school financing, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the legal 
implications of their different language. [d. For instance, although involving 
a Category III education clause, the California Supreme Court ruling in Serrano 
v. Priest that unequal public school fil1ancing violated the California Consti-
tution, discussed supra note 9, was ultimately decided under state equal 
protection guarantees. 
The remaining states fall into Category IV. [d. at 1667 n.123. Category 
IV education clauses are said to impose the greatest obligation on states, 
typically providing that education is fundamental, primary or paramount. [d. 
at 1667-68. Category IV clauses have not been subject to much litigation. /d. 
at n.I24. 
The two cases considering Category IV clauses, Seattle School District No. 
1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978), and McDaniel v. Thomas, 
248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981) have reached differing conclusions. Note, 
To Render Them Safe, supra, at 1667-68 n.124. In McDaniel, the Supreme 
Court of Georgia held that Georgia Constitution art. VIII § 1, which states 
that "[t]he provision of an adequate public education for the citizens shall be 
a primary obligation of the State of Georgia," does not "require the state to 
equalize educational opportunities." 248 Ga. 635, 643, 285 S.E.2d 156, 164. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Washington found that Washington 
Constitution art. IX § 1, which provides that it is "the paramount duty of the 
state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within 
its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, 
or sex," imposes a duty on the state, and concluded that the state system of 
school financing during the school year 1975-76 did not comply with the 
constitutional mandate to provide ample provision for education. Seattle School 
District No.1, 90 Wash. 2d at 511-14, 585 P.2d at 91-92. 
Interestingly, the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington in Seattle 
School District No. 1 expressly overruled its earlier decision in Northshore 
School District No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 727-31, 530 P.2d 178, 
201-03 (1974), in which the court held that the public school financing scheme 
did not violate either the state equality or education clauses. Using reasoning 
similar to that of the Hornbeck court, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780, the 
Kinnear court stated that "[t]here was no evidence that any child had been 
deprived of accreditation, promotion or admission to other schools because his 
district failed to meet state standards or that any student ... had been forced 
to bring suit to compel his district to provide classes that met state standards." 
84 Wash. 2d at 694-95, 530 P .2d at 184. One commentator has suggested that 
had the Kinnear plaintiffs been able to demonstrate that such a suit had been 
filed, they would have prevailed. Note, To Render Them Safe, supra, at 1669 
n.135 (citation omitted). 
While not discussing Seattle School District No.1, the Hornbeck court 
did consider McDaniel. 295 Md. at 637, 458 A.2d at 779. The Hornbeck court 
noted that "the [McDaniel] court concluded from the evidence that a direct 
relationship existed between a district's level of funding and the educational 
opportunities which a school district was able to provide its children." [d. 
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spending yo Since Hornbeck, however, several states which have· 
considered public school financing schemes dependent upon local 
wealth, in light of state constitutional mandates to provide thorough 
and/or efficient public education, have held such financing schemes 
unconstitutionaL 171 
In 1984, the superintendent of San Antonio's impoverished Edge-
wood School District persuaded activists to challenge the public 
school financing scheme under the Texas Constitution. 172 In 1989, 
sixteen years after the Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez,173 a unanimous Supreme Court of Texas held in Edgewood 
(citation omitted). The Hornbeck court stated that, nonetheless, under Mc-
Daniel, local districts are not restricted from "doing what they can to improve 
educational opportunities within the district," nor does the Georgia education 
clause "require the state to equalize educational opportunities." [d. (citations 
omitted). The Hornbeck court further noted that the McDaniel court found 
that the Georgia Legislature had not disregarded its obligation to provide an 
"adequate" education. [d. (citations omitted). 
In the context of public school financing, the ultimate question is the saine 
whether the state education clause falls into Category II, III, or IV. The court 
must ask whether the standard of quality imposed by the state constitution 
mandates public school financing reform. See Note, To Render Them Safe, 
supra, at 1663 n.111, 1667 n.121, 1668 n.I24. In determining whether that 
constitutional standard of quality has been met, however, it is logical for a 
court to place greater reliance on cases interpreting the exact same constitutional 
language than on cases interpreting language which is clearly different. [d. 
Within the last few years, four Category II states have found their public 
school financing schemes unconstitutional under state constitutions using lan-
guage virtually the same as that in the Maryland education clause: New Jersey 
(thorough and efficient); Montana (thorough); Texas and Kentucky (efficient). 
170. See supra note 162. 
171. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) 
(courts may and should involve themselves in defining the standards of con· 
stitutionally mandated thorough and efficient system of education) (citing the 
landmark case of Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979»; 
Helena Elementary School Dist. No.1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 
(1989), opinion amended, 236 Mont. 44, 784 P.2d 412 (1990); Abbott v. Burke, 
119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 
777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1989). 
Twenty-four states have considered state constitutional challenges to public 
school financing schemes based on local wealth. See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 314-
15, 575 A.2d at 373. Nine states have held such a financing scheme invalid 
under their state education article. [d.; see also Note, Unfulfilled Promises, 
infra note 190, at 1072. Three of these states have also determined that such 
a scheme also violated equal protection guarantees. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 314-
15, 575 A.2d at 373. A tenth state, California, held that such a scheme violated 
only state equal protection guarantees. [d. Fourteen states, including Maryland, 
have thus far rejected both constitutional claims. [d. See generally Briffault, 
supra note 22, at 24-39. 
172. NAT'L L.J., Jan. 14, 1991, at 30-31. 
173. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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Independent School District v. Kirbyl74 that the Texas public school 
financing scheme violated a provision of the Texas Constitution 
requiring the maintenance of an "efficient" system of public schools 
so as to achieve "general diffusion of knowledge."17s The Edgewood 
court found that "efficient" conveyed the meaning of "effective" 
or "productive of results," 176 and that evidence of the disparity in 
financial and educational resources among school districts clearly 
indicated that the legislature's good faith efforts were insufficient to 
meet the constitutionally mandated level of education 177 under a 
public school financing scheme dependent upon local wealth. 178 The 
court held that the legislature must provide a public school financing 
scheme in which the districts would have "substantially equal access 
to similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort. "179 The 
Edgewood court reasoned· that, under the Texas Constitution, the 
state legislature, not local government, is obligated to provide for an 
efficient system of public education. l80 The court stated: "Whether 
the legislature acts directly or enlists local government to help meet 
its obligation, the end product must still be what the constitution 
commands, i.e., an efficient system of public free schools throughout 
the state." 181 
Unfortunately, two legislative attempts to cure the defective 
financing scheme have also been rejected as unconstitutional. In a 
continuation of the Kirby case, the Supreme Court of Texas found 
that, as the first modification to the state education financing scheme 
preserved reliance on local property taxes as the primary source of 
funds, the new system also violated the efficiency requirement of the 
education clause. 182 After four special legislative sessions, a new 
education funding law was passed only four days before a special 
master would have taken control of the state's public school financing 
system under the initial Kirby decision. 183 The new system equalized 
funding; however, because this was accomplished by creating special 
taxing districts whose property tax rates were controlled by the state 
legislature, the act was struck down as an unconstitutional state ad 
valorem tax. 184 
174. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989), a/I'd, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991). 
175. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 397. 
176. Id. at 395. 
177. Id. at 397. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 397-98. 
181. Id. at 398. 
182. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991). 
183. Sherman, supra note 22, at I. 
184. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Ind. School Dist. v. Edgewood Ind. School Dist., 
826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992). 
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Contemporaneous with the initial Edgewood decision, the Su-
preme Court of Kentucky, in Rose v. Council for Better Education, 
Inc. "SS found that the Kentucky General Assembly's efforts to pro-
vide an "efficient system of common schools," as mandated by the 
Kentucky Constitution, had failed under a financing scheme based 
on local wealth.ls6 The Rose court held that Kentucky's entire system 
of public schools, including the method of financing, was unconsti-
tutional. IS? The Rose court held that the General Assembly must 
adequately finance public schools in a manner which assures that the 
ultimate control over efficient education remains with the legisla-
ture. ISS The Rose court reasoned that no other decision was possible 
due to the overall inadequacy of Kentucky'S public school system, 
the great disparity in educational opportunity throughout the state, 
185. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
186. [d. at 194-99, 213. After reviewing the landmark case of Pauley v. Kelly, 162 
W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979), in which the Supreme Court of West 
Virginia adopted a definition of "thorough and efficient" after extensive 
historical analysis involving a thorough examination of other state education 
clauses, the Rose court explained its interpretation of "efficient:" 
In defining 'efficient,' we use all the tools made available· to us. In 
spite of protestations to the contrary, we do not engage in judicial 
legislating. We do not make policy. We do not substitute our judgment 
for that of the General Assembly. We simply take the plain directive 
of the constitution, and armed with its purpose, we decide what our 
General Assembly must achieve in complying with its solemn consti-
tutional duty. 
Any system of common schools must be created and maintained 
with the premise that education is absolutely vital to the present and 
future of our Commonwealth .... 
The sole responsibility for providing the system of common schools 
is that of our General Assembly .... 
The General Assembly must not only establish the system, but it 
must monitor it on a continuing basis so that it will always be 
maintained in a constitutional manner. The state must carefully su-
pervise it, so that there is no waste, no duplication, no mismanage-
ment, at any level. 
The system of common schools must be adequately funded to 
achieve its goals (emphasis added). The system of common schools 
must be substantially uniform throughout the state. Each child, every 
child, in this Commonwealth must be provided with an equal oppor-
tunity to have an adequate education (emphasis in original). Equality 
is the key word here. The children of the poor and the children of 
the rich, the children who live in the poor districts and the children 
who live in the rich districts must be given the same opportunity and 
access to an adequate education. This obligation cannot be shifted to 
local counties and local school districts. 
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 2110. 
187. [d. at 215. 
188. [d. at 216. 
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and the great disparity and inadequacy of local financial effort 
throughout the state. 189 
The Rose court did not tell the General Assembly how to provide 
adequate financing for the public school system, only that it must 
do so efficiently, based on the court's interpretation of the Kentucky 
Constitution. The court did state, however, that if ad valorem taxes 
on real and personal property were implemented, the General Assem-
bly would have the obligation to ensure that taxed property was 
assessed at "100% of its market fair value," and that tax rates 
would be uniform.1OO 
The Rose court viewed its decision as an opportunity for the 
General Assembly to "launch the Commonwealth into a new era of 
educational opportunity which will insure a strong economic, cultural, 
and political future." Unlike other state legislatures which appear 
uncooperative in response to court orders for improved public school 
financing,191 the Kentucky General Assembly complied with the Rose 
court's order without resistance. 192 Kentucky taxpayers agreed, with-
out protest, to provide an additional 2.5 billion dollars to the public 
school system. 193 In the words of former Kentucky Governor Bert 
Coombs, "there was a feeling among the people ... that the time 
had come when they had to do something about their school system 
or ... we would always remain a mediocre state." 194 
Also in 1989, the Supreme Cou-rt of Montana unanimously ruled, 
in Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State,19S that the 
Montana constitutional provision that "[e]quality of education op-
portunity is guaranteed to each person of the state," is to be 
construed according to the plain meaning of its words. l96 Because 
the court found that "spending disparities among the State's school 
districts translate into a denial of equality of educational opportu-
189. Id. at 213. In contrast to Texas, the Kentucky Legislature cooperated with the 
court order to increase financing for economically disadvantaged children. 
According to Bert Coombs, lead plaintiff's counsel and former Governor of 
Kentucky, "the legislature faced up to the mandate and did enact what has 
been called the most enlightened and revolutionary change in schools in this 
country." Sherman, supra note 182, at 1. 
190. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 216. 
191. Sherman, supra note 182, at 1 (discussing the apparent noncooperation of state 
legislatures in New Jersey, Kentucky and Montana); see generally Note, Un-
fulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARV. L. 
REv. 1072 (1991) (arguing that legislative inertia and unwarranted judicial 
deference to the political branches in the remedial phase hinder the plaintiff's 
prospects for securing a constitutional remedy). 
192. Sherman, supra note 182, at 1. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989). 
196. Id. at 52-53, 769 P.2d at 689. 
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nity," it held that "excessive reliance" on local revenues for public 
school financing was unconstitutional. I97 Ironically, in 1974 this same 
court had unanimously upheld the state's public school financing 
scheme under the rational basis test. 198 Fifteen years after this deci-
sion, and shortly after vetoing the legislature's initial response to the 
Helena Elementary School District decision, new state financing 
provisions were enacted. l99 As a result, Montana provided an addi-
tional 100 million dollars to its public school system, boosting state 
support for public schools from thirty-five percent to seventy-eight 
percent.200 
Of particular relevance to a renewed constitutional challenge to 
the Maryland public school financing scheme is a change in New 
Jersey law which established statewide qualitative standards for New 
Jersey Public Schools.101 The Hornbeck court distinguished the New 
Jersey Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Robinson v. Cahilp02 on the 
basis that New Jersey had no law establishing qualitative standards 
for public schools.203 This change in New Jersey's law renders moot 
the Hornbeck court's efforts to distinguish Robinson.204 
Similar to the plaintiffs in Hornbeck, the Robinson plaintiffs 
were children from poorer districts who raised a constitutional chal-
lenge to the state's public school financing scheme.lOs As in Maryland, 
the New Jersey public school financing scheme depended heavily on 
the financial resources of each local school district,206 and incontro-
vertible evidence demonstrated that the existing financing scheme 
197. [d. at 54, 769 P.2d at 690. 
198. See State ex reI. Woodahl v. Straub, 164 Mont. 141, 153, 520 P.2d 776, 783, 
cerl. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974); see also Note, To Render Them Sale, supra 
note 168, at 1665 n.1I4 (proposing that the opposite outcomes "may be 
attributed to changing financial realities, the demonstrated ineffectiveness of a 
system that was relatively new in 1974, and the replacement of all but one of 
the justices on the court."). 
199. Sherman, supra note 182, at I. 
200. [d. 
201. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-1 to 7A-52 (West 1989). 
202. 118 N.J. Super. 223, 236-56, 287 A.2d 187, 194-204, a/I'd on rehearing, 119 
N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972), modified, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, 
(Robinson I), a/I'd on rehearing, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (Robinson 11), 
cerl. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). . 
203. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 638-39, 458 
A.2d 758, 779-80 (1983). 
204. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cerl. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). 
205. Robinson, 118 N.J. Super. at 227-29, 287 A.2d at 189. 
206. [d. at 229-31, 287 A.2d at 190-91 (local taxes furnished 6711Jo of public school 
costs). For the 1986-87 fiscal year, the average state public school finance 
system reli:d on local revenues for 43.9 percent of its budget. See NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR Eouc. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF Eouc., DIGEST OF Eouc. 
STATISTICS 1989, at 149. 
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fostered excessive financial disparities.207 Additionally, the Robinson 
court was required to interpret the New Jersey Constitution, which, 
much like the Maryland Constitution, provides: 
The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and sup-
port of a thorough and efficient system of free public 
schools for the instruction of all the children in the State 
between the ages of five and eighteen years.lOS 
As in Hornbeck, the trial court in Robinson held that, because 
of the resulting disparities among the various school districts with 
respect to their ability to finance education, the state's public school 
financing scheme violated equal protection guarantees.209 Unlike 
Hornbeck, the trial court's decision was affirmed on appeal, but on 
the ground that New Jersey's public school financing scheme violated 
the thorough and efficient clause of the state constitution.210 
The Robinson court found that the constitutional guarantee of 
a "thorough and efficient" education required equality of expendi-
tures for the minimum mandated educational opportunity needed to 
equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the 
labor market of contemporary society. 211 The court stated that "if 
the State chooses to assign its obligation . . . to local government, 
the State . . . must compel the local school districts to raise the 
money necessary to provide that educational opportunity. 212 
After the 1973 decision in Robinson, the question of the con-
stitutionality of New Jersey's public school financing scheme contin-
ued through the New Jersey courts before it eventually became the 
impetus for legislative response. Initially, the Robinson court deferred 
remedial action to allow the New Jersey Legislature time to enact 
satisfactory financing legislation.213 This time was extended in 1975.214 
Subsequently, however, in the absence of legislative action, the court 
authorized a provisional remedy to effectuate the constitutional en-
titlement to a thorough and efficient system of public schools.21s 
Only then did the New Jersey Legislature take action to correct the 
public school financing scheme. Before the judicial remedies became 
207. Robinson, 118 N.J. Super. at 235-46, 287 A.2d at 193-99. 
208. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV, 1 I. 
209. Robinson, 118 N.J. Super. at 276-80, 287 A.2d at 215-16. 
210. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 515-19, 303 A.2d 273, 295-97 (Robinson I), 
a/I'd on rehearing, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (Robinson II), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 976. 
211. See Robinson I, 62 N.J. at SIS, 303 A.2d at 295. 
212. Id. at 519, 303 A.2d at 297 (emphasis in original). 
213. Robinson II, 63 N.J. at 198, 306 A.2d at 66. 
214. Robinson V. Cahill, 67 N.J. 35, 37, 335 A.2d 6, 7 (1975) (Robinson III). 
215. Robinson V. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 147-51,351 A.2d 713, 718-22 (Robinson IV), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975). 
1991) Judicial Inte"ention in Public Education 467 
effective, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the Public School 
Education Act of 1975.216 The Robinson court then found that, as a 
result of the incorporation of statewide qualitative standards of 
education, the 1975 Act was in facial compliance with the "thorough 
and efficient" clause.217 
The statewide qualitative standards adopted by the New Jersey 
Legislature parallel those adopted by the Maryland State Board of 
Education in the Maryland School Performance Program.218 The 
1975 Act defines a thorough and efficient system of public schools 
as one which provides all children, "regardless of socioeconomic 
status or geographic location, the educational opportunity which will 
prepare them to function politically, economically, and socially in a 
democratic society.' '219 
The Robinson court specifically reserved judgment on the ques-
tion of whether the 1975 Act would pass constitutional muster as 
applied to any individual school district,220 but upheld the 1975 Act 
as constitutional, assuming it was fully funded. 221 In fact, the Ro-
binson court went so far as to point out that there is a significant 
connection between the amount of money spent and the quality of 
216. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-I to 7A-52 (West 1989). 
217. Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 467-68, 355 A.2d 129, 139 (1976) (per curiam) 
(Robinson JI). 
218. In addition to defining the general goal of a thorough and efficient education, 
the New Jersey Legislature specifically acknowledged the major elements of 
the State's obligations: 
a. Establishment of educational goals at both the state and local 
levels; 
b. Encouragement of public involvement in the establishment of 
educational goals; 
c. Instruction intended to produce attainment of reasonable levels 
of proficiency in the basic communications and computational 
skills; 
d. A breadth of program offerings designed to develop the indi-
vidual talents and abilities of pupils; 
e. Programs and supportive services for all pupils especially those 
who are educationally disadvantaged or who have special edu-
cational needs; 
f. Adequately equipped, sanitary and secure physical facilities, and 
adequate materials and supplies; 
g. Qualified instructional and other personnel; 
h. Efficient administrative procedures; 
i. An adequate State program of research and development; and 
j. Evaluation and monitoring programs at both the State and local 
levels. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-5 (West 1989). 
219. [d. at § 18A:7A-4. 
220. Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 455, 355 A.2d at 131-32. 
221. [d. at 467, 355 A.2d at 139. 
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educational opportunity. 222 Perhaps it should come as no surprise 
then that the legal challenge spawned in Robinson lasted for more 
than a decade; in the end, the incorporation of statewide qualitative 
standards for thorough and efficient education· was not enough to 
keep New Jersey's public school financing scheme from being found 
unconstitutional as applied to poorer urban districts when the public 
financing scheme continued to be dependent upon local wealth.223 
By 1990, it had become abundantly clear to the New Jersey 
courts that, without sufficient State money. education had failed in 
the poorer urban school districts. 224 In response. the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey unanimously held in Abbott v. Burke22S that, despite 
the acknowledged efforts of the legislature. the Public School Edu-
cation Act of 1975 approved in Robinson had failed to accomplish 
the goal of a thorough and efficient education for all public school 
children.226 
The Abbott court expressly stated that the thorough and efficient 
clause did not require an equal dollar amount to be spent per 
student. 227 To achieve the equality required by the thorough and 
efficient clause. however. all school districts must attain minimum 
substantive standards. 22s The number of dollars spent per student is 
relevant only if it impacts on the substantive education offered in a 
given district. 229 
222. Id. at 481, 355 A.2d at 145-46. 
223. See Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 295, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (1990). The 
Robinson I court recognized the great discrepancies between local needs and 
local fiscal capacities, noting that there was no correlation between the local 
tax base, and the "number of pupils to be educated, or the number of poor 
to be housed and clothed and fed, or the incidence of crime and juvenile 
delinquency, or the cost of police or fire protection, to the demands of the 
judicial process." Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 501, 303 A.2d 273, 287 
(Robinson I), afl'd on rehearing, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (Robinson 11), 
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). The court stated that there may have been 
some rough correlation in the past, but added that "[s]urely that is not true 
today in our state." Id. Though acknowledging the cost of local control in 
terms of inequality in resources and spending, the Robinson I court rejected 
the contention that the local control could be satisfied without local control 
of financing. Id. at 499-500, 303 A.2d at 286-87. Abbott clearly shows that 
treating local control of public school financing as essential to effective local 
government is at best illusory, and that reform is required to allow more 
effective control for all districts. 
224. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 295, 575 A.2d at 363. 
225. 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990). 
226. Id. at 295, 575 A.2d at 363. 
227. Id. at 305, 575 A.2d at 368. 
228. Id. (stating the equality required by Robinson was "based on ~he proposition 
that the Constitution required a certain level of education, that which equates 
with thorough and efficient"). 
229. Id. at 309, 575 A.2d at 370. 
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In Abbott, school children from Camden, East Orange, Jersey 
City and Irvington230 contended that the thorough and efficient clause 
of the New Jersey Constitution requires substantial equality in edu-
cational financing.231 The plaintiffs claimed that the 1975 Act as 
applied was systematically productive of financial and educational 
disparities which rendered the entire Act unconstitutional,232 or at 
least as applied to specific districts or a specific class of districts.233 
In support of this claim, the plaintiffs presented evidence of sub-
stantial disparity in expenditures and educational input between the 
poorest and richest districts. 234 
The State argued that statistical evidence fails to prove that a 
significant relationship exists between education expenditures and 
property wealth. 235 The State further argued that money is not a 
critical factor in the quality of education.236 The State asserted that 
disparity in financing does not establish the failure to provide thor-
ough and efficient education, nor does it establish any consequent 
disparity in substantive education.237 
The Abbott court responded by observing that the issues involved 
questions of educational theory debated over the years, and that the 
only thing universally agreed upon was that urban schools are fail-
ing.238 
The court held that, in order to meet the constitutionally man-
dated level of education, public school financing 
cannot be allowed to depend on the ability of local school 
districts to tax, but had to be guaranteed and mandated by 
the State, and that the level of financing had to be adequate 
to provide for the special educational needs of poor urban 
230. [d. at 296, 575 A.2d at 363. In 1981, Marilyn Morheuser, Director of the 
Education Law Center in Newark, brought suit on behalf of the four inner-
city school districts, claiming that New Jersey's complicated public school 
financing scheme actually increased the disparities between wealthy and poor 
school districts. Sherman, supra note 182, at 1. In August 1988, an adminis-
trative law judge agreed and rejected the State's argument that poorer district's 
had caused their own financial problems by inadequate management efforts. 
Even before the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in Abbott, the newly elected 
Governor of New Jersey, James Florio, became the first governor in the 
country to declare a public school financing system based on local wealth 
inequitable, and promised more money for poorer school districts. [d. 




235. [d. at 375, 575 A.2d at 403. But see Briffault, supra note 22, at 27. 
236. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 376, 575 A.2d at 403. 
237. [d. at 376, 575 A.2d at 403-04. But see Briffault, supra note 22, at 27. 
238. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 376-77, 575 A.2d at 404. 
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districts in order to redress their extreme disadvantages.239 
The court then held the 1975 Act unconstitutional as applied to 
poorer urban school districts,240 and ordered the 1975 Act amended 
to assure financing of education in poorer districts substantially equal 
to that of the wealthier districts.241 
Disparity in public school financing was an important factor in 
the Abbott court's conclusion that the education provided for stu-
dents in poorer urban districts would not enable them to compete 
with their suburban colleagues or to function effectively as citizens 
in society.242 While disparity alone did not render the 1975 Act 
unconstitutional, the court found disparity of financing relevant to 
its constitutional conclusion.243 This conclusion was based not only 
on the court's finding of a substantive defect in the quality of 
education in the poorer urban districts but was based also on the 
significant disparity of spending between the poorer urban districts 
and the wealthier districts. 244 The Abbott court observed that 
"[w]hatever else the evidence shows, it is clear that in' New Jersey 
today, as we assume in the United States, the greater the students' 
needs, the less their education"245 and that "[t]heir deprivation is 
real, of constitutional magnitude, and not blunted in the least by the 
State's statistical analysis.' '246 
Abbott flatly rejects the argument that the establishment of 
statewide qualitative standards governing the educational process247 
is alone sufficient to meet the constitutional mandate for a thorough 
and efficient system of public schools. The Abbott court focused on 
the fact that, even with qualitative standards of education under the 
1975 Act, "[e]ducation has failed [in the poorer urban school dis-
tricts] for both the students and the State."248 The court recognized 
that, under a public school financing scheme dependent upon local 
wealth, "the evidence compels but one conclusion: the poorer the 
district and the greater its need, the less money available, and the 
239. [d. at 295, 575 A.2d at 363. 
240. [d. 
241. [d. The court's remedy left the expenditure disparity intact, so long as it did 
not interfere with the right of the poorer districts to receive a thorough and 
efficient education. [d. 
242. [d. at 382-83, 575 A.2d at 407. 
243. [d. 
244. [d. at 383, 575 A.2d at 407. 
245. [d. at 319, 575 A.2d at 375. 
246. [d. at 347, 575 A.2d at 389. 
247. But c/. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 639, 458 
A.2d 758, 780 (1983). 
248. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 295, 575 A.2d at 363. 
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worse the education. That system is neither thorough or [sic] effi-
cient. "249 
In reaching its conclusion, the Abbott court was aware that 
money alone would not achieve the constitutional mandate of a 
thorough and efficient education in the poorer urban districts.25o The 
court refused to ignore the fact that the existing educational programs 
in poorer schools were not designed to meet, nor were they suffi-
ciently addressing, the pervasive array of problems that inhibit the 
education of poorer urban children.2s1 Regardless of how much money 
was spent, these schools could not provide a thorough and efficient 
education without educational reform. 2S2 Nonetheless, the court also 
refused to discount the rights of school children in poorer urban 
districts simply because they were disadvantaged by accident of their 
environment, compounded by an inadequate education.2S3 Where the 
state had compounded the wrong, it must provide a remedy. 254 As 
Chief Judge Wilnetz eloquently stated: 
If the claim is that additional funding will not enable 
the poorer urban districts to satisfy the thorough and effi-
cient test, the constitutional answer is that they are entitled 
to pass or fail with at least the same amount of money as 
their competitors. 
If the claim is that these students simply cannot make it, 
the constitutional answer is, give them a chance. The Con-
stitution does not tell them that since more money will not 
help, we will give them less; that because their needs cannot 
be fully met, they will not be met at all. It does not tell 
them they will get the minimum, because that is all they 
can benefit from. Like other states, we undoubtedly have 
some "uneducable" students, but in New Jersey there is no 






253. [d. at 375, 575 A.2d at 403. 
254. [d. 
255. [d. In the summer of 1990, the New Jersey Legislature appeared willing to 
cooperate in fulfilling Governor Florio's promise of more money for poorer 
school districts. Sherman, supra note 182, at 1. The legislature passed the 
Quality Education Act, which was part of Governor Florio's plan to balance 
the state budget by cutting deeply into state programs, raising over a billion 
dollars in new sales taxes, and doubling the income tax of the state's wealthiest 
residents. Id. This Act would have added 1.1 billion dollars to public schools, 
and would have forced local districts to pay for teachers' pensions. [d. Because 
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In 1983, the Hornbeck court emphasized that Maryland, in 
contrast to New Jersey, had established statewide qualitative stan-
dards through legislation, regulations and the bylaws adopted by the 
State Board of Education. 256 Therefore, the Hornbeck court properly 
distinguished Robinson because, at the time Robinson originally was 
decided in 1973, New Jersey had not yet established even minimal 
statewide qualitative standards for education. 257 Robinson dealt solely 
with the financial aspects of New Jersey's public school financing 
scheme because its existing law did not define "thorough and effi-
cient" education, and the parties did not show other relevant criteria 
by which to measure compliance with the constitutional mandate.258 
The Hornbeck court relied on Robinson on the basis "that absent 
such standards the tax burden could not be left to local initiative 
with any hope that statewide equality of educational opportunity will 
emerge. "259 Additionally, the Hornbeck court noted that the New 
Jersey Legislature appeared. either unwilling or unable to obey its 
"constitutional mandate. "260 
Though not addressed in Hornbeck, the New Jersey Legislature's 
actions in response to Robinson placed New Jersey in a substantially 
similar position to that of Maryland with regard to providing a 
thorough and efficient system of public school education. In fact, 
the Robinson court approved the 1975 public school financing scheme 
specifically because it incorporated statewide qualitative standards of 
education.261 Moreover, both the Hornbeck and Robinson courts 
the wealthier districts paid higher teacher salaries, requiring the local districts 
to pay for teacher's pensions would have burdened the wealthier districts. Id. 
The legislature amended the Quality Education Act, however, and instead 
shifted the pensions back to the state and diverted a third of the new aid to 
property tax relief, largely to the benefit of suburban districts. Id. Education 
reformers claim that in amending the Quality Education Act, lawmakers gave 
in to pressure from teachers' organizations and the wealthy suburban districts. 
Id. On June 12, 1991, Marilyn Morheuser again brought suit claiming that this 
public school financing scheme not only fails to solve the problem of financing 
disparities, it continues to widen the gap between poorer and wealthier districts. 
Id. 
256. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 639,458 A.2d 
758, 780 (1983). 
257. [d. 
258. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 515-16, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (Robinson I), 
a//'d on rehearing, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (Robinsnn 11), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 976 (1973). 
259. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 638, 458 A.2d at 780 (quoting Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 
516, 303 A.2d at 295). 
260. [d. at 638 n.l3, 458 A.2d at 780 n.l3. 
261. The Robinson V court stated that the statute "at once seeks to define the 
constitutional promise, identify the components of which it consists, establish 
a procedural mechanism for its implementation and afford the financial means 
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recognized that, while left to the discretion of the legislature, the 
definition of a thorough and efficient system of education is evolving, 
and must be judged according to contemporary qualitative stan-
dards. 262 Finally, Robinson and Hornbeck each implicitly stand for 
the proposition that statewide qualitative standards of education can 
be satisfied only with sufficient financial support. 263 
In the wake of Abbott, coupled with the recent decisions in 
Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby,264 Rose v. Council 
for Better Education, Inc., 265 and Helena Elementary School District 
No.1 v. State,266 a sound basis exists for judicial intervention in the 
area of public school financing based on local wealth.267 As the 
Abbott court recognized, money that supports a thorough and effi-
cient public school education is public money, whether it is local or 
state money. Under the Maryland Constitution, the source, amount, 
distribution, and use of money for public school financing is au-
thorized and controlled by the State.268 Under article VIII, the State 
necessary for its fulfillment." Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 456, 355 A.2d 
129, 132 (1976) (per curiam) (Robinson V). The court stated that it has been 
"constantly mindful that money is only one of a number of elements that 
must be studied in giving definition and content to the constitutional promise 
of a thorough and efficient education." Id. As in Robinson IV, the court 
recognized that "individual and group disadvantages, use of compensatory 
techniques for the disadvantaged and handicapped, variation in availability of 
qualified teachers in different areas, effectiveness in teaching methods and 
evaluation thereof, professionalism at every level of the system, meaningful 
curricula, exercise of authority and discipline, and adequacy of overall goals 
fixed at the policy level." Id. 
262. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780; Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 457-
58, 355 A.2d at 133. 
263. Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 457, 355 A.2d at 133; Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639, 458 
A.2d at 780. 
264. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). 
265. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
266. 769 P .2d 684 (Mont. 1989). 
267. See also Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 33, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 
(1983) (it is unconstitutional to base an education funding system on local 
property tax); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (public 
school financing which relies on property taxes causes disparities among school 
districts and violates equal protection); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 
A.2d 359 (1979) (state financing of education based on local property tax, 
without regard to a town's financial ability violates equal education opportu-
nity); Seattle School Dist. No.1 v. State, 90 Wash.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) 
(state has a paramount duty to make ample provision for the education of 
resident children); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979) 
(disparities among state's education financing violates equal protection guar-
antees); Washakie County School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 
(Wyo.) (state's school financing scheme based on local property taxes violates 
equal protection), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). 
268. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 631-32, 458 
A.2d 758, 776 (1983). 
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is obligated to spend that money to provide adequate education for 
all citizens.269 This means that disadvantages of poorer urban districts 
must be taken into consideration when financing public schools, 
because "all students are entitled to be treated equally, to begin at 
the same starting line. "270 If used effectively, money can give all 
Maryland school children at least the chance to succeed.271 
IV. RAISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO 
MARYLAND'S PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING SCHEME 
As with the decision in Abbott, a successful constitutional chal-
lenge to Maryland's public school financing scheme must be based 
on a well developed record, extensive offers of proof, and a thorough 
statistical analysis which is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
Fundamentally, the ability to reform the disparities and inadequacies 
caused by a public school financing scheme dependent upon local 
wealth rests on the willingness of the court to recognize that students 
in poorer school districts are no less citizens than students in wealthier 
districts.272 
In Hornbeck, the plaintiffs offered only evidence of disparity of 
financing and educational inputs to show that a public school fi-
nancing scheme based on local wealth violated the state constitution's 
thorough and efficient clause. In Abbott, neither the plaintiffs nor 
the State were able to convince the court of what was necessary for 
a thorough and efficient education.273 Nonetheless, the Abbott court 
found that, whatever the standard was, the poorer urban school 
districts fell below it. 274 The Abbott court recognized evidence of 
269. See id. The financial burden entailed in providing a thorough and efficient 
system of public schools in no way lessens the constitutional duty. Rose v. 
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 208 (Ky. 1989) (citations 
omitted). 
In fact, a California Superior Court Judge recently ruled that the state 
would be failing to meet its constitutional obligation to provide students with 
public education "basically equivalent" to that offered elsewhere in the state, 
by allowing public schools in a bankrupt school district to shutdown six weeks 
early. Judge Halts Plan to Close Schools in California District, Education 
Week, May 8, 1991, at 1. Ironically, the bankrupt district was once hailed as 
a national model for parental choice and other school reforms. Id. After the 
judge intervened, the state stepped in with a loan to carry the district through. 
the end of the school year. Id. The loan carries with it broad trustee powers 
to the state to oversee district finances. Id. The judge's decision narrowly 
averted the closing of 47 schools, which would have left 31,500 students without 
a teacher, or even a classroom. Id. 
270. See Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 375, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (1990). 
271. See id. at 295-96, 575 A.2d at 363. 
272. See id. at 375, 575 A.2d at 403. 
273. See id. at 318, 575 A.2d at 375. 
274. Id. 
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inadequate education that also is evident in Baltimore City when it 
stated:27S 
Does the combination of student need, disproportionately 
present in poorer urban districts, inferior course offerings, 
dilapidated facilities, testing failures, and dropout rates leave 
the issue [of whether the students in these districts are 
provided a thorough and efficient education] in doubt?276 
The Abbott court was unable to conclude that most districts 
were failing, in part because the burden was on the plaintiffs to 
show that a thorough and efficient education was not being delivered. 
The court reached its decision not only out of deference to the 
legislature, but also because it concluded that a constitutional vio-
lation would not be found solely on disparity of financing. 277 Yet, 
given a history of disparate funding and clear evidence of inadequate 
education in the poorer urban districts, the court in effect shifted 
the burden to the State to show that the financing scheme was 
constitutional as applied to the poorer urban districts. In so doing, 
the court stated: "[W]hile we are unable to conclude from this record 
that the State is clearly wrong, we would not strip all notions of 
equal and adequate funding from the constitutional obligation unless 
we were convinced that the State was clearly right. "278 
Furthermore, the Abbott court stated that, no'matter how prom-
ising plans to make urban schools more effective appeared, the fact 
that the State was trying to implement them was not enough to show 
that present expenditure levels would lead to thorough and efficient 
schools.279 Under Abbott, the measurement of the constitutional 
requirement of thorough and efficient means "more than teaching 
the skills needed to compete in the labor market. ... It means being 
able to fulfill one's role as a citizen, a role that encompasses far 
more than merely registering to vote. It means the ability to partic-
ipate fully in society .... "280 
275. See J. MuRPHY, MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK sec. IOOO(A) (1989). While 
the court may not take judicial notice of facts simply because they are personally 
known to him, the court may consider any evidence that the legislature can 
consider, such as studies by educational experts showing that the inadequa!=y 
of public education is related to lack of sufficient funds caused by a public 
school financing scheme based on wealth. [d.; see, e.g., Brown v. Board of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
276. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 318, 575 A.2d at 375. 
277. See id. at 393, 575 A.2d at 412. 
278. [d. at 377, 575 A.2d at 404. 
279. [d. at 378, 575 A.2d at 405; see also Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 
777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989). 
280. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 363, 575 A.2d at 397; see also Rose v. Council for Better 
Educ. Inc., 709 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989). 
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The Hornbeck court, while recognizing disparity with regard to 
financing and educational opportunity among Maryland school dis-
tricts, prudentially deferred to the General Assembly to define and 
provide adequate education under the thorough and efficient clause 
of the Maryland Constitution. The Abbott court also recognized that, 
because educational sufficiency ultimately must be the responsibility 
of the legislature, there is a limit to the court's powers in this area.281 
In order to resolve the issue of whether statewide qualitative standards 
of education are met, however, Maryland courts need only turn to 
the appropriate state agency: the State Board of Education. 282 
Maryland school children now have the evidence which was 
lacking in Hornbeck; a public school financing scheme based on 
local wealth violates the thorough and efficient clause of the State 
Constitution. In addition to evidence of the disparity of financing 
and educational opportunity, by the State Board of Education's own 
evidence Maryland's public school financing scheme does not result 
in the constitutionally-mandated level of adequate education. The 
MSPP Reports provide empirical evidence that, at the very least, 
Baltimore City has failed to meet the State of Maryland's qualitative 
standards of education in areas of basic competency required to 
graduate from high school. 
Thus, as in Abbott, the constitutionality of Maryland's public 
school financing scheme can no longer be presumed.283 With hard 
evidence that Maryland public schools are failing to meet the State's 
own definition of thorough and efficient education, the court is 
entitled to ask for proof of the General Assembly's effort to achieve 
the legislatively defined goal and for proof of reasonable success at 
achieving that goal to effectuate compliance with the mandate of 
article VIIJ.284 Moreover, as interpreter of the Constitution, the court 
has a duty to speak when the General Assembly has failed Maryland 
school children, and to say that the failure must be remedied.28s 
There is no constitutional right to an excellent public school 
education. 286 The Hornbeck court correctly stated that, under the 
Maryland Constitution, the state's obligation is limited to providing 
281. See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 322, 575 A.2d at 377. 
282. See J. MURPHY, MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK sec. lOOO(A)(3) (1989) "on 
rare occasions. judicial notice is taken of what are conveniently characterized 
as 'political' facts .... To resolve this issue, the trial judge simply contacts 
the appropriate branch of government and follows that branch's decision on 
the issue." Id.; see infra notes I & 8-15 and accompanying text. 
283. See Biegel, supra note I (discussing the application of heightened scrutiny in 
equal educational opportunity issues). 
284. C/. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 322, 575 A.2d at 377. 
285. C/. id. 
286. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County 8d. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 632, 458 A.2d 
758, 776 (1983). 
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the means for the legislatively defined standard of basic or adequate 
education throughout the state.287 Under the existing financing scheme, 
public education may be successful for some children, while children 
attending Baltimore City schools clearly are being deprived of an 
adequate education in basic skills. Wealthier parents, who desire 
more for their children than the basic education mandated by the 
Maryland Constitution, have the option to send their children to 
private schools, or to move into neighborhoods with the better 
schools. 288 Parents with lesser means have no such choice.289 While 
financing a basic public education may result in a less than ideal 
public education for some, that is not sufficient justification for 
ignoring the constitutional mandate to provide a thorough andeffi-
cient system of public education for al1. 290 
Some may argue that public school financing reform would 
eliminate local control over education. This argument, however, has 
no merit. As the Edgewood court stated: 
An efficient system does not preclude the ability of com-
munities to exercise local control over the education of their 
children. It requires only that the funds available for edu-
cation be distributed equitably and evenly. An efficient 
system will actually allow for more local control, not less. 
It will provide property-poor districts with economic alter-
natives that are not now available to them. Only if alter-
natives are indeed available can a community exercise the 
control of making choices.291 
In fact, local autonomy in the area of public school financing is 
central to preventing greater equality. 292 Eliminating school districts' 
dependency on local wealth for public school financing will not alone 
create adequate education, but it is a crucial step in remedying 
Maryland's failure to provide an effective education in basic skills 
in all districts throughout the state. 
Since, as evidenced by the MSPP Reports, Baltimore City school 
children are being significantly deprived of an adequate education, 
and since gross inequities in the quality of educational opportunity 
among Maryland school districts exist, the situation in Baltimore 
City is particularly ripe for a constitutional challenge. Maryland's 
existing public school financing scheme ignores the special needs of 
287. [d. 
288. See Briffault, supra note 22, at 221·22. 
289. [d. 
290. C/. Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 340, 575 A.2d 359, 386 (1990). 
291. 777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (N.J. 1989). 
292. See Briffault, supra note 22, at 5 & 23·29 (discussing the history of public 
school financing cases and the interest of local autonomy). 
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disadvantaged students, the effects of municipal overburden, and 
results in lack of sufficient preparation of students in poorer urban 
districts to compete in the job market or function as responsible 
citizens in our democratic society. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When faced with this issue, the Maryland courts should follow 
New Jersey's enlightened treatment of public school financing based 
on local wealth, and take affirmative steps to remedy this ongoing 
constitutional violation. To be in compliance with article VIII, the 
General Assembly must be required to amend Maryland's public 
school financing scheme, or to pass new legislation to assure that 
educational financing is substantially equal. Indeed, because the 
Hornbeck court rejected uniform financing, it left open the possibility 
that additional state financing could be allowed to address extreme 
disadvantages. 293 Identifying the districts in need of additional state 
financing to address extreme disadvantages and providing a mecha-
nism for financing public schools in general are responsibilities of 
the legislature.294 Yet it is the court's constitutional duty to enforce 
the General Assembly's affirmative duty under article VIII to provide 
sufficient financing for an effective public school education in basic 
skills in all Maryland school districts. 295 
Elizabeth Colette Derrrig 
293. See Abbott, 119 N.]. at 397-98, 575 A.2d at 409. 
294. See id. at 385-86, 575 A.2d at 408-09. 
295. See id. at 386, 575 A.2d at 409. Perhaps, in response to such a judicial 
declaration, the Maryland General Assembly will surprise us, as did the 
Kentucky legislature, by acting swiftly to implement a constitutional system of 
public school financing. See supra notes 184-193 and accompanying text. 
